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CRIMINAL LAW-RETROACTIVE LAW OR PUNISHMENT FOR A
NEW OFFENSE?-THE

Ex

POST FACTO IMPLICATIONS OF AMEND

ING THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING VIOLATIONS OF SU
PERVISED RELEASE

INTRODUCTION

Supervised release was created under the Sentencing Reform
Act of 19841 ("Act") as "a new form of post-imprisonment supervi
sion."2 The Act authorizes a sentencing court to require a defend
ailt to complete a term of supervised release after completing an
actual prison sentence. 3 If a court imposes a term of supervised
release, it also establishes the conditions of that release. 4 If a de
fendant fails to abide by the mandated conditions, the court has
several options, which include extending the term, modifying the
conditions, or revoking supervised release and imposing another
term of imprisonment.s
Conflict among the United States courts of appeals has arisen
in cases where statutes governing supervised release violations have
been amended and then applied to defendants who committed their
crimes before these new provisions came into existence. The first
of these amendments had the effect of removing judicial discretion
in certain supervised release violation cases by requiring courts to
impose mandatory prison terms.6 The second amendment author
ized courts to impose, after revoking a defendant's term of super
vised release, a sentence consisting of both imprisonment as well as
an additional term of supervised release.7 Because, under the for
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-3673 (1994) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 1994». For a discussion and evaluation

of the Sentencing Refonn Act of 1984, see Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REv. 83 (1988).
2. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL, ch. 7, pt. A(2)(b) (1995).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (1994).
4. See id. § 3583(d).
5. See id. § 3583(e). See infra Part I.A for a discussion of the supervised release
system.
6. See id. § 3583(g). See infra note 75 and accompanying text for a discussion of
subsection (g).
7. See id. § 3583(h). See infra note 77 and accompanying text for a discussion of
subsection (h).
499

500

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:499

mer versions of these provisions, violations of release might have
resulted in lesser prison time or less time subject to supervision,
these defendants argued that the application of the new provisions
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution by altering
past punishment.8
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is the only court
that did not find an ex post facto violation by reasoning that the
amended provision in question provided punishment for a new of
fense. 9 The Sixth Circuit treated supervised release violations, for
purposes of ex post facto analysis, as separate offenses from the
crime for which the defendant was originally sentenced. In turn,
the court considered the penalties imposed for supervised release
violations as separate punishments, having no relation to the origi
nal sentence. 10 Every other federal circuit to address this issue has
determined that punishment for supervised release violations was a
part of the punishment for the original offense, and that the appli
cation of the new statutory provisions to defendants who were sen
8. U.S. CoNST. art I, § 9, d. 3. "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed." Id. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause and the
Supreme Court's analysis of potential ex post facto violations.
9. See United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. O.
2529 (1996); see also Hanley V. United States, No. 95-1992, 1996 WL 476404 (6th Cir.
Aug. 20, 1996) (adhering to the reasoning in Reese). It should be noted that several
courts of appeals have held that the application of subsection (h) does not constitute an
ex post facto violation, reasoning that the application of this subsection to defendants
who committed their crimes before that subsection's enactment did not have the effect
of increasing the punishment for the original crime as required under the Supreme
Court's ex post facto analysis. See, e.g., United States V. Brady, 88 F.3d 225 (3d Cir.
1996) (holding that the application of subsection (h) did not change the legal conse
quences of the defendant's original crime); United States V. St. John, 92 F.3d 761 (8th
Cir. 1996) (concluding that the imposition of subsection (h) does not disadvantage a
defendant sentenced prior to that subsection's enactment); United States V. Sandoval,
No. 95-1326, 1995 WL 656488 (1st Cir. Nov. 7, 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. O. 77 (1996)
(finding no ex post facto violation because that circuit had already interpreted subsec
tion (e)(3) to allow what subsection (h) articulates). See infra Part I.C for a discussion
of the Supreme Court's ex post facto analysis. Only the Court of Appeals for the Sev
enth Circuit, in United States V. Beals, 87 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 1996), held that the applica
tion of subsection (h) constitutes an ex post facto violation. See infra notes 144-145 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Beals.
This Note focuses on those decisions in which courts of appeals have confronted
the retroactive nature of the amended statutory provisions governing supervised release
violations under ex post facto analysis, which have primarily involved subsection (g).
See infra note 99 for the definition of "retroactive." Because the Seventh Circuit in
Beals addressed the issue of retroactivity, in the context of subsection (h), this Note
incorporates the Seventh Circuit's reasoning into its analysis. The issues raised in the
remaining subsection (h) decisions are outside the scope of this Note.
10. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 590 (stating that the defendant was returned to prison to
serve time for the supervised release violation, not for the original criminal conduct).
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tenced before the enactment of those provisions constituted an ex
post facto violation. l l
This Note considers the arguments that have emerged concern
ing the ex post facto implications of applying amended supervised
release statutory provisions to defendants sentenced before the en
actment of those provisions. Part I discusses the Sentencing Re
form Act of 1984 and the development of the supervised release
system. It discusses the relevant statutory provisions concerning su
pervised release and supervised release violations, along with the
corresponding policy statements issued by the United States Sen
tencing Commission. In addition, Part I introduces the United
States Supreme Court's analytical framework for examining possi
ble ex post facto violations. It also presents the two lines of ex post
facto cases that have served as the basis for the courts of appeals'
holdings on this issue.
Part II presents the two conflicting arguments that have
emerged in the courts of appeals concerning the ex post facto impli
cations that have arisen as a result of applying the amended super
vised release provisions. Part III questions the soundness of the
arguments asserted by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
This Note concludes by suggesting that the Sixth Circuit's reasoning
lacks the validity to justify its unique decision.
I. . BACKGROUND
The analysis of this issue begins with a brief look at the super
vised release system and how this system was developed as part of
sentencing reform. This section provides an overview of sentencing
reform as well as a discussion of the principal features of supervised
11. See Beals, 87 F.3d at 860 (stating that the government only punishes the con
duct constituting the supervised release violation because of the defendant's original
offense); United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1121 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that amend
ments which alter the consequences of supervised release violations alter an integral
part of the punishment for the original offense); United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873,
881 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that "[f]or revocation purposes, the conduct [upon which
revocation is based] simply triggers the execution of the conditions of the original sen
tence"); United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that the
alteration of supervised release punishment constitutes a "post hoc alteration of the
punishment for an earlier offense") (quoting Fender v. Thompson, 883 F.2d 303, 306-07
(4th Cir. 1989»; see also United States v. Flora, 810 F. Supp. 841, 843 (W.D. Ky. 1993)
(treating revocation of supervised release "as the legal consequence of a defendant's
original offense, rather than the sole consequence of acts committed while on super
vised release").
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release. It also discusses the case law used by the courts of appeals
to resolve the ex post facto issue.
A.

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing
Commission and the Advent of Supervised Release

When Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,12
its purpose was to remedy the inadequacies of the existing federal
sentencing systemP Before the Act, the system was based primar
ily on a "rehabilitation model," where the Parole Commission's
method of determining which prisoners were "rehabilitated" led to
disparate results. 14 Under that system, Congress would enact crimi
nal statutes, sentencing judges· would then de.termine what
sentences to impose within the permissible statut0I"Y,' range, and the
Parole Commission would subsequently determine the actual
length of the defendant's sentence. IS Because sentencing laws pro
vided little guidance, federal sentencing judges were "left to apply
12. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 u.s.c.
§§ 3551-3673 (1994) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994». The Sentencing Refonn Act is a

chapter of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II,
98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.c. and 28
U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994».
13. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3221-22 (outlining what the Senate Judiciary Committee considered to be the principal
problems with the federal sentencing system as it existed at the time). In refonning the
sentencing system, Congress had three basic objectives: (1) to establish a fair and effec
tive system through honest sentencing; (2) to seek reasonable unifonnity in sentencing
by narrowing the disparity in sentences for similar crimes; and (3) to establish a propor
tionate sentencing system that imposes appropriate sentences based on the severity of
the offense. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1995). For a
discussion of the history of sentencing refonn and the enactment of the guidelines, see
Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223 (1993); Weigel,
supra note 1; Todd L. Newton, Note, Commentary that Binds: The Increased Power of
the United States Sentencing Commission in Light of Stinson v. United States, I I 3 S. CL
1913 (1993), 17 U. ARK. LITILE ROCK L.J. 155 (1994); see also Mistretta v. United
States,488 U.S. 361,363-70 (1989).
14. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3221. Under
this "rehabilitation model," sentencing judges would typically impose long prison tenns,
allowing for parole eligibility after the prisoner had served one-third of the tenn. The
Parole Commission would bear the responsibility of setting a release date upon a deter
mination that the prisoner had been rehabilitated. See id. at 40, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3223.
The Supreme Court has stated that "the rationale behind parole was that it was
actually possible to rehabilitate the offender, thus reducing the likelihood that he or she
would revert to criminal activity upon returning to society." Newton, supra note 13, at
160-61 n.54 (citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363).
15. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365; Newton, supra note 13, at 160.
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[their] own notions of the purposes of sentencing. "16 This resulted
in a wide range of sentences for defendants who had committed
very similar crimes, and was identified by Congress as a primary
justification for changing the systemPWithout a structured sen
tencing system, Congress believed that judges were left with "unfet
tered discretion" in determining the length of sentences, while the
Parole Commission was left to decide to what extent, if any, a pe
riod of incarceration had rehabilitated the prisoner.1 8
Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act in an effort to
formulate a comprehensive statement of federal sentencing law that
would provide the desired consistency.19 The Act eliminated pa
role, as well as the United States Parole Commission,2° and created
the United States Sentencing Commission ("Sentencing Colnmis
sion").21 The Sentencing Conimission is' an independent agency in
the judicial branch composed of seven voting members, appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and one
non-voting member.22 The primary duties of the Sentencing Com
mission are to establish sentencing guidelines ("Guidelines")23 and
policy statements24 "that will further the basic purposes of criminal
16. S. REp. No. 98-225, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3221.
17. See id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3221.
18. See id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3223.
19. See id. at 39, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3222.
20. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367; Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake
of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681,
1689 (1992); Newton, supra note 13, at 162.
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994).
22. See id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL; ch. 1, pt. A(l) (1995). The
President appoints each of the voting members after consultation with judges, prosecu
tors, defense attorneys, and other parties interested in the criminal justice process. See
28 U.S.C. § 994(a). The constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission was confirmed
against separation of powers attack in Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). For a discussion
of the Mistretta decision, see Martin H. Redish, Separation of Powers, Judicial Author
ity, and the Scope of Article III: The Troubling Cases of Morrison and Mistretta, 39
DEPAUL L. REv. 299 (1989); Lisa G. Esayian, Note, Separation ofPowers-The Federal
Sentencing Commission: Unconstitutional Delegation and Threat to JudiciIJl ImpartiIJl
ity? Mistretta v. United States, 80 J. CJuM. L. & CRIMINOWGY 944 (1990); Charles R.
Eskridge, III, Note, The Constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Reform Act After
Mistretta v. United States, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 683 (1990); Laura Leigh Taylor & J. Rich
ard Neville, Note, Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989): Upholding the Con
stitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines, 40 MERCER L. REv. 1429 (1989); Kristin L.
Tnnm, Note, "The Judge Would Then Be the Legislator": Dismantling Separation of
Powers in the Name of Sentencing Reform-Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647
(1989),65 WASH. L. REv. 249 (1990).
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(I).
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2). In Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992),
the Supreme Court stated that the purpose of policy statements "is limited to interpret
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punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and reha
bilitation."25 Congress believed that the establishment of the Com
mission and the promulgation of Guidelines would provide the
necessary structure needed to ensure fair and consistent
sentencing.26
ing and explaining how to apply the Guidelines, and ... 'provid[ing] guidance in assess
ing the reasonableness of any departure from the guidelines.''' Id. at 212 (quoting U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES § IB1.7). Additionally, in Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S.
36 (1993), the Court held that the Sentencing Commission's commentary to the guide
lines is authoritative and therefore must be followed by federal courts "unless it violates
the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous read
ing of, [a] Guideline." Id. at 38. Thus, as a result of the holdings in both Williams and
Stinson, both the commentary to the Guidelines and the policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission, at least those which "interpret" Guideline provisions, are
equally binding on the courts. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in
Stinson, see generally Newton, supra note 13.
In addressing the policy statements contained in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing
Guidelines Manual concerning violations of probation and supervised release, courts of
appeals have reasoned that because these statements do not interpret guidelines, they
are merely advisory in nature. These courts have often cited the language used by the
Sentencing Commission in Chapter 7 to justify their decisions: "These policy statements
will provide guidance while allowing for the identification of any substantive or proce
dural issues that require further review." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch.
7, pt. A(l) (1995) (emphasis added). See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 88 F.3d 225 (3d
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 773 (1997); United States v. Hurst, 78 F.3d 482 (10th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Caves, 73 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. West, 59
F.3d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 486 (1995); United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638
(4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hill, 48 F.3d 228 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Mi
lano, 32 F.3d 1499 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278 (2d Cir.
1994); United States v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Levi, 2 F.3d
842 (8th Cir. 1993).
25. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A(2) (1995). The Guide
lines promulgated by the Sentencing Commission are based on a classification system
whereby every offense is categorized and graded based on its relative seriousness. See,
e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2Al.1-2A1.5(1995) (outlining various
forms of homicide); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994 (outlining the duties of the Sentencing
Commission). The Guidelines are designed to provide judges with sentencing ranges,
which are determined by the corresponding category of the offense. See S. REp. No. 98
225, at 51 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3234.
26. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 39, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3222.
Although the Sentencing Reform Act was designed to end sentencing disparity, com
mentators have questioned whether the Act actually achieved that goal. See, e.g., Al
bert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation,
58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901 (1991); Gerald W. Heaney, Revisiting Disparity: Debating
Guidelines Sentencing, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 771 (1992); Gerald W. Heaney, The Real
ity of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 161 (1991);
Roger J. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the Federal Courts, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 681
(1992).
For more general discussions of and views on the Sentencing Commission and the
Sentencing Guidelines, see Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1988); Freed, supra
note 20; Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
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Under the Guidelines system, Congress intended for sentenc
ing courts to retain some discretion in imposing sentences.27 Pres
ervation of discretion is consistent with a primary goal of the Act
to allow sentencing judges to address the needs of individual of
fenders. 28 Accordingly, sentencing courts can consider the circum
stances surrounding each particular case in detennining the
appropriate sentence.29
The supervised release system, created under the Act, evi
dences an attempt by Congress to preserve the sentencing judge's
Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J.
393 (1991); Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Emperor's New Clothes: Due Process Considera
tions Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 60 TENN. L. REv. 467 (1993); Paul H.
Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1987); W.
Crews Lou, Note, Balancing Burdens of Proof and Relevant CondUCt" At What Point is
Due Process Violated, 45 BAYLOR L. REv. 877 (1993); Lisa M. Rebello, Note, Sentenc
ing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Five Years of "Guided Discretion", 26 SUF·
FOLK U. L. REv. 1031 (1992); Jonathan Sharif, Comment, Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Due Process Denied, 33 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 1049 (1989); Robert H. Smith,
Note, Departure Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Should a Mitigating or Aggra
vating Circumstance Be Deemed "Adequately Considered" Through "Negative Implica
tion?", 36 ARIZ. L. REv. 265 (1994).
27. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 39, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3222. Con
gress stated that sentencing reform legislation "should assure the availability of a full
range of sentencing options from which to select the most appropriate sentence in a
particular case." Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3222.
28. See id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3222.
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994) (outlining the factors courts must consider in
imposing a sentence); id. at § 3553(b) (stating that a sentencing court may deviate from
established guideline ranges when it finds "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of
a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Com
mission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described"); see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 51-52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3234-35. If the sentencing court elects to depart from the Guidelines, however, it must
state its reasons for doing so, and an appellate court may subsequently review the rea
sonableness of this departure. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANuAL, ch. 1, pt. A(2) (1995). For discussions of the issue of departure as well as the
standard of review under the Sentencing Guidelines, see Michael S. Gelacak et al., De
partures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential
Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REv. 299 (1996); Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Exami
nation of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (1991); Smith, supra note 26.
For discussions of the issue of judicial discretion, or lack thereof, under the Sen
tencing Guidelines, see Freed, supra note 20; Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing
Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CIuM. L. & CRlMINOLOGY 883
(1990); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 MARv. L. REv. 1938 (1988); Janet Alberghini, Comment,
Structuring Determinate Sentencing Guidelines: Difficult Choices for the New Federal
Sentencing Commission, 35 CA'm. U. L. REv. 181 (1985); Steve Y. Koh, Note, Reestab
lishing the Federal Judge's Role in Sentencing, 101 YALE L.J. 1109 (1992).
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discretion. 30 A form of post-imprisonment supervision, supervised
release replaced the traditional parole system, which Congress
viewed as a primary contributor to the inadequate state of the sen
tencing process in the pre-Act period. 31 Unlike a term of parole,
which served to replace a remaining portion of a defendant's prison
sentence, supervised release is imposed at the time of initi~ sen
tencing as part of the sentence itself.32 Supervised release does not
end a term of imprisonment prematurely, but rather follows a com
pleted term of imprisonment.33
.
A term of supervised release is similar to a term of probation.
Both are systems in which a defendant serves a sentence outside of
prison, subject to specified conditions. 34 The principal difference
between the two systems is that instead of following a term of im
prisonment, probation serves as a sentence in and of itself, and is
used as an alternative to incarceration. 35 The primary goal of su
30. For a detailed summary of the supervised release system, see Harold Baer, Jr.,
The Alpha & Omega of Supervised Release, 60 ALB. L. REv. 267 (1996).
31. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 38-39, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.AN. at 3221-22;
see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. I, pt. A(3) (1995) (stating that the
reason for abolishing parole was to assure honesty and fairness in sentencing, as "the
sentence imposed by the court [would be] the sentence the offender [would] serve");
see supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inadequacies of the
federal sentencing system prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984..
32. See 1~ U.S.C. § 3583(a) (1994). Under the parole system, a defendant was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment with the possibility of being released on some date
before the end of the term. Subsequently, the Parole Commission would make a deter
mination as to whether the prisoner could be released and allowed to serve the remain
ing portion of the sentence on parole supervision. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 38,
reprinted in 1984·U.S.C.C.AN. at 3221. In making this determination, the Parole Com
mission was allowed to consider a wide variety of variables, which included the history
and characteristics of the prisoner, as well as reports from any and all sources. See ill. at
38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. at 3221, n.6 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 4206, 4207 (1982)
(repealed 1984». This wide discretion was the source of the disparate release dates that
Congress set out to eliminate. See ill. at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.AN. at 3221.
33. See ill.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL, ch. 7, pt. A(2)(b)
(1995).
34. See generally 18 U.S.c. §§ 3563, 3583 (1994); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES
MANUAL, ch. 5, pts. B, D (1995).
35. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. B, introductory com
mentary (1995); 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(3) (1994) (stating that probation may not be or
dered if a term of imprisonment is imposed for the same or a different offense); Baer,
supra note 30, at 269. The Guidelines authorize the sentencing court to impose a term
of probation in place of imprisonment provided that it complies with statutory restric
tions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5B1.1. Con
ditions for probation and penalties for violations of those conditions are treated in the
same manner as supervised release by the Sentencing Commission. See U.S. SENTENC.
ING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 7, §§ 5B1.4, 5D1.3 (1995) (governing conditions and via
·Iations of probation and supervised release); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a), 3583(d) (1994).
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pervised release is to ease a defendant's transition into the commu
nity after serving a term of imprisonment. 36
Supervised release was developed by Congress as a method of
tailoring sentences to the needs of particular defendants because it
permits the court to evaluate whether, and to what extent, a de
fendant needs post-imprisonment supervision.37 Unless the imposi
tion of a term of supervised release has been deemed mandatory by
statute, courts consider a variety of factors in determining a defend
ant's need for supervised release after imprisonment. 38 Addition
ally, while the maximum lengths of supervised release terms are
dependent upon the classification of the defendant's offense, courts
have the authority to determine the specific length as long as it falls
within the permissible statutory range. 39
Additionally, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not distinguish between su
pervised release and probation for the purposes of revocation procedures. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32.1.
36. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 124, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3307.
37. See id. at 123, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3306. A court may impose a
term of supervised release to follow any sentence of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.c.
§ 3583(a). However, a court is required to order a term of supervised release to follow
imprisonment if required to do so by statute or if the defendant has been convicted for
the first time of a domestic violence crime. See id. A court is also required to impose a
term of supervised release when a sentence of imprisonment of more than one year is
imposed. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL, § 501.1(a) (1995). However, a
court may depart from the Guidelines' requirement as long as it provides reasons for its
departure and imposes a reasonable sentence. See 18 U.S.c. § 3553(b), (c)(2) (1994).
The Sentencing Guidelines also allow a court to depart if it determines that a term of
supervised release is not required by statute or is not necessary for the following rea
sons: (1) to protect the public welfare; (2) to enforce a financial condition; (3) to pro
vide drug or alcohol treatment or testing; (4) to assist the reintegration of the defendant
into the community; or (5) to accomplish any other sentencing purpose authorized by
statute. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § SOU, commentary (1995).
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994) (providing the factors that a court is required
to consider in determining whether to impose a term of supervised release). For exam
ple, courts are required to consider: the nature and circumstances of the offense; the
history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to pro
vide adequate deterrence, public protection, and to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment; as well
as any applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission
that are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced. See id.
39. See 18 U.S.c. § 3583(b) (1994) (providing the authorized terms of supervised
release). These terms include: up to five years for a Class A or B felony, up to three
years for a Class C or 0 felony, and up to one year for a Class E felony or for a
misdemeanor other than a petty offense. See id. Offenses are classified in 18 U.S.c.
§ 3559. Additionally, unless otherwise required by statute, the Guidelines require a
court to include a term of supervised release of three to five years for a Class A or B
felony; two to three years for a Class C or 0 felony; and one year for a Class E felony or
a Class A misdemeanor. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5D1.2(a)
(1995). A court may depart from the Guideline ranges, but the term of supervised
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Terms of supervised release are accompanied by conditions
which govern a defendant's conduct while on release.40 For exam
ple, courts must require that the defendant not commit another
crime and not possess a controlled substance during the term of
supervision. 41 Courts can also impose additional conditions pro
vided that these conditions conform to statutory requirements.42
After ordering a term of supervised release, courts have the author
ity to terminate, extend, or modify the conditions depending upon
the defendant's subsequent conduct.43
B.

Violations of Supervised Release
1.

The Statutory Provisions

In addressing violations of supervised release, courts issue a
warrant for the arrest of the defendant.44 A preliminary hearing is
release imposed may not exceed the maximum terms stated in 18 u.s.c. § 3583(b). See
Baer, supra note 30, at 275.
In determining the length of the term of supervised release, a court is required to
consider the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.c. § 3583(c); see also
supra note 38 (discussing these factors). A court may include a term of supervised
release in addition to the statutory maximum term of imprisonment. See Baer, supra
note 30, at 275 n.52.
40. See generally 18 U.S.c. § 3583(d). When a defendant pleads guilty to an of
fense, courts must explain to the defendant, in open court, the "effects" of a term of
supervised release. See FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(c)(I); see also Baer, supra note 30, at 283
85 for a discussion of these procedural requirements as well as the consequences of a
court's failure to adhere.
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).
42. See id. In determining the conditions of supervised release, a court is re
quired to consider the factors provided in § 3553(a). See § 3583(c); see also supra note
38 (discussing these factors); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL, § 5D1.3(b)
(1995). In addition, a court may incorporate any of the conditions recommended as
conditions for probation under § 3563(b) as well as any other condition the court deems
necessary. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).
The Sentencing Commission has also issued policy statements which provide a list
of recommended conditions of supervised release and probation. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDEUNES MANUAL, § 5B1.4 (1995). The reasonableness of the conditions imposed
by the court may be reviewed by an appellate court in a similar manner to appellate
review of departures from the Guidelines in sentencing, discussed supra note 29. See
also id. ch. 1, pt. A(2); Baer, supra note 30, at 276-82 (discussing issues surrounding
conditions of supervised release).
43. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(I)-(2). A court may terminate a term of supervised
release at any time after one year based on the defendant's conduct. See id.
§ 3583(e)(I). A court may extend the term of release up to the maximum term that
could have been imposed for the defendant's offense. See id. § 3583(e)(2). It may also
"modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release" provided that the
court adhere to Rule 32.1(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id.
44. See 18 U.S.c. § 3606 (1994). This statute reads that the defendant must be
"taken without unnecessary delay before the court having jurisdiction over him." Id.
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then conducted to determine whether there is probable cause to
hold the defendant for a revocation hearing. 45 If probable cause is
not established, the court must dismiss the defendant. 46 On the
other hand, if probable cause is established, the defendant is held
for a revocation hearing. 47
At a revocation hearing, defendants are afforded more rights
than at the preliminary hearing.48 However, a revocation hearing is
not a formal tria1. 49 For example, defendants are not entitled to a
jury nor are they protected against self-incrimination.50 Courts
have been rehictant to require these procedural protections in revo
45. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a). Congress has incorporated the due process re
quirements of a preliminary hearing and a final revocation hearing, established by the
Supreme Court in parole and probation violation cases, into Rule 32.1 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Baer, supra note 30, at 285 (citing Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485, 487 (1972);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 advisory committee's notes (1979 addition».
If arrested for violating a condition of supervised release, a defendant must be
given:
(A) notice of the preliminary hearing its purpose and of the alleged violation;
(B) an opportunity to appear at the hearing and present evidence in the per
son's own behalf; (C) upon request, the opportunity to question witnesses
against the person unless, for good cause, the federal magistrate decides that
justice does not require the appearance of witnesses; and (0) notice of the
person's right to be represented by counsel.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(1)(A)-(D); see also Baer, supra note 30, at 286.
46. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(1). The revocation hearing, as its name suggests,
establishes whether a defendant has violated the conditions of release and whether the
term of release should be revoked. See Baer, supra note 30, at 287 (citing FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(2) advisory committee's notes (1979 addition».
47. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(1)-(2). Initially, when the supervised release
system was first proposed and developed, revocation was not intended to be a conse
quence of violating conditions of release. Rather, modification of conditions was seen
by the Senate Judiciary Committee as the appropriate course of action. See S. REp. No.
98-225, at 125 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,3308. The Committee stated
that defendants who had violated conditions of their release could be held "in contempt
of court." Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3308. Additionally, the Committee
stated that "[it] did not provide for revocation proceedings for [a] violation of a condi
tion of supervised release because it [did] not believe that a minor violation ... should
result in resentencing of the defendant and because it beJieve[d] that a more serious
violation should be dealt with as a new offense." Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3308.
48. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(2)(A)-(E). For example, "(1) the notice of the
alleged violation must be written; (2) the evidence against the defendant must be dis
closed; and (3) the defendant need not specifically request the opportunity to question
adverse witnesses." Baer, supra note 30, at 287 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(2)(A)
(E».
49. See Baer, supra note 30 at 287.
50. See iii. at 287-88 (citing Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786). "Although a revocation
proceeding must comport with the requirements of due process, it is not a criminal
proceeding." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,435 n.7 (1984).
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cation hearings because these hearings have not been considered
criminal prosecutions.51 Nonetheless, as opposed to a probation
revocation hearing, in which "a court need only be 'reasonably sat
isfied' that a probationer has not met the conditions of proba
tion,"52 the burden of proof at a supervised release revocation
hearing is a preponderance of the evidence. 53
In determining whether to revoke a defendant's term of super
vised release, courts are required to consider the factors stated in 18
U.S.c. § 3553(a) as well as the Guidelines and policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission. 54 If a court decides that rev
ocation is necessary, it has the authority to sentence the defendant
to prison for all or part of the term of supervised release that was
allowed under the statute for the offense that initially resulted in
the term of supervised release. 55 However, in determining the
length of the new prison term, the court must adhere to statutory
limitations.56 This term of imprisonment, when combined with the
time a defendant has already served in prison for the original of
fense, may have the cumulative effect of exceeding the maximum
term allowed under the statute authorizing the initial imposition of
supervised release. 57
2.

The Sentencing Commission's Approach

Under 28 U.S.c. § 994(a)(3), Congress required the Sentencing
Commission to issue guidelines or policy statements concerning
probation and supervised release violations. 58 When the Commis
51. See Baer, supra note 30 at 289-90.
52. Id. at 289 (citing United States v. Goad, 44 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1975».
53. See 18 U.S.c. § 3583(e)(3) (1994); Baer, supra note 30, at 289-92 (discussing
additional procedural protections afforded and not afforded defendants at revocation
hearings); see also infra note 147.
54. See 18 U.S.c. § 3583(e). See supra note 38 (discussing these factors).
55. See id. § 3583(e)(3). Courts are required to consider the factors stated in
§ 3553(a), just as they would in deciding whether to revoke a tenn of release, in deter
mining the length of imprisonment upon revocation. See id. § 3583(e).
56. See id. § 3583(e)(3). This section states that defendants may not be required
to serve more than five years in prison if the offense that resulted in the tenn of super
vised release was a Class A felony; more than three years if the offense was a Class B
felony; more than two years if the offense was a Class C or D felony; and no more than
one year in any other case. See id.
57. See Baer, supra note 30, at 292-93 (citing United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d
1282, 1285-86 (10th Cir. 1995».
58. See 28 U.S.c. § 994(a)(3) (1994); U.S. SENIENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch.
7, pt. A(l) (1995). See supra note 24 for a comparison of guidelines to policy state
ments issued by the Sentencing Commission.
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sion first began establishing a system for sanctioning criminal viola
tions of probation and supervised release,59 it considered two
different approaches.60 The first approach was to consider a viola
tion of probation or supervised release· as a "breach of trust."
Under this approach, the penalty imposed for the violation would
be intended to sanction a defendant for failing to abide by the con
ditions of release. 61 Only the seriousness of the conduct constitut
ing the violation would be considered, "to a limited degree," in
determining the appropriate sanction.62 The punishment for new
. criminal conduct would be left to the court responsible for imposing
the sentence for that offense.63
Under the second approach, the Commission contemplated
sanctioning defendants for the particular conduct constituting the
violation as if that conduct were being sentenced as a new criminal
offense. 64 This option would have called for the application of the
Sentencing Guideliites "to any [new] criminal conduct that formed
the basis of the [release] violation ...."65 The defendant's criminal
history would then have been recalculated to determine the appro
priate sanction for violating release.66
The Sentencing Commission elected to adopt the first ap
proach and treat a violation of probation or supervised release as a
breach of trust, with the court addressing the violation merely tak
ing into account the nature of the most recent conduct as well as the
defendant's history in determining the appropriate punishment.67
The Commission chose this "breach of trust" approach for several
reasons, including its belief that the court having jurisdiction over
the most recent conduct was the more appropriate body to impose
59. The Sentencing Commission elected to treat probation and supervised release
as "functionally equivalent" for the purposes of establishing policy statements concern
ing violations of these forms of court-ordered supervision. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE.
LINES MANUAL, ch. 7, pt. B, introductory commentary (1995).
60. See id. ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b). The debate focused on how to treat these violations,
which would constitute violations of release as well new crimes in and of themselves, in
determining an appropriate sanction. See Itl.
61. See ill. .
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See ill.
65. Id. As would have been the case for any other offense, Chapters Tho and
Three of the Sentencing Guidelines would have been applied to this new criminal con
duct. See ill.
66. See id. Recalculation of the defendant's criminal history would have been
done under Chapter Four of the Sentencing Guidelines. See ill.
67. See ill.
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punishment for that offense.68 It subsequently drafted policy state
ments regarding violations of probation and supervised release that
reflected the "breach of trust" approach. 69 The statements classify
probation and supervised release violations into three grades. 70
Depending on the grade of the violation, the court is instructed as
to the appropriate action.71 Because courts must only consider
these statements, sentences which do not conform to those recom
mended by the Commission are not considered departures, and
"[t]he sentence will likely be affirmed provided the court consid
ered the Chapter Seven policy statements, the sentence was within
the statutory maximum, and the sentence was reasonable."72
3. The Relevant Statutory Amendments
Since the inception of supervised release system under the Sen
tencing Reform Act in 1984, Congress has recognized the need for
new statutory provisions governing particular release violations.?3
In 1988, 18 U.S.c. § 3583(g) was added as part of the Anti-Drug
68. See id. The Sentencing Commission also stated that it wanted the sanction
imposed for the breach of trust to be in addition to, or consecutive to, the sentence
imposed for the new conduct. It concluded that the second approach would have led to
duplicated efforts among courts whereby the violation sentence would have often been
"subsumed" in the sentence imposed for the new conduct itself. Id.
In addition, the Commission concluded that the second option was impractical be
cause it was often quite difficult for the sanctioning court to obtain the necessary facts
and witnesses needed if the Guidelines were to be applied to the new offense. See id.
69. See id. § 7B1.1. The Commission opted to issue policy statements as opposed
to guidelines in an effort to first accumulate and later evaluate information and opin
ions concerning the effectiveness of their sanctions. See id. ch. 7, pt. A(I).
70. See id. § 7B1.l(a). Grade A violations consist of conduct constituting a fed
eral, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year
that is a crime of violence, is a controlled substance offense, is one which involves pos
session of a firearm or destructive device, or any other federal, state or local offense
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding twenty years. Grade B violations con
sist of conduct constituting any other federal, state, or local offense punishable by a
term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Grade C violations consist of conduct con
stituting a federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of one
year or less, or conduct constituting a violation of any other condition of supervised
release. See id. The Commission notes that these grades of violations are only applica
ble in cases where the defendant has been placed on supervised release for committing
a felony or Class A misdemeanor, and do not cover cases in which the defendant was
under supervision for a Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction. Such cases are
dealt with under § IB1.9. See id. ch. 7, pt. B, introductory commentary.
71. See id. § 7B1.3 (outlining policy statements governing the revocation, modifi
cation, and extension of probation and supervised release).
72. Baer, supra note 30, at 299 (citing United States v. Mathena, 23 F.3d 87, 93
n.13 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278, 284 (2d Cir. 1994».
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (1994) for a chronological list of amendments.
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Abuse Act,14 establishing mandatory revocation of supervised re
lease for possession of controlled substances while on supervised
release. 75 Additionally, 18 U.S.c. § 3583(h) was added in 1994
under the Violent Crime Control Act,76 authorizing the court, upon
revoking a term of supervised release and sentencing a defendant to
another term of imprisonment, to place the defendant on another
term of supervised release following this additional imprisonment. 77
The ex post facto issue examined in this Note arose as courts
began to apply the new provisions to defendants who had already
been sentenced to terms of supervised release under the former
versions of these statutes. These defendants pointed to the fact that
for these same violations, section 3583(g) originally allowed for ju
dicial discretion in determining the lengths of new prison terms.78
Additionally, before the enactment of section 3583(h), courts dif
fered as to whether they could impose another term of supervised
release to follow the new term of imprisonment.79 The defendants
argued that applying the new provisions to their cases constituted
an ex post facto violation80 because it had the effect of altering the
terms of their original sentences. 81
74. Pub. L. No. 100-690, TItle VII, § 7303(b)(2), 102 Stat. 4181, 4464 (1988).
75. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (1988) (amended 1994) (stating that the court shall
tenninate the tenn of supervised release and require the defendant to serve in prison
not less than one-third of the tenn of supervised release). This statute was later
amended to authorize mandatory revocation for possession of a controlled substance,
for possession of a fireann in violation of federal law or in violation of a specified
condition of supervised release, and for refusal to comply with required drug testing.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (1994). The limitation concerning the imposed tenn of impris
onment was also amended and instructed the court not to exceed the maximum tenn of
imprisonment authorized under subsection (e)(3). See id.
76. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110505(3), 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
77. See § 3583(h). This subsection pertains to cases where a tenn of supervised
release is revoked and a defendant is required to serve a tenn of imprisonment that is
less than the maximum tenn of imprisonment authorized under subsection (e)(3). The
length of the supervised release tenn may not exceed the tenn of supervised release
authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original tenn of supervised
release, less any tenn of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised
release. See id.
78. See United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 1995), cerL denied, 116 S. Ct.
2529 (1996); United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Pas
kow,l1 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1992).
79. See supra note 9 for examples of cases addressing the effect of subsection (h).
80. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause and the
Supreme Court's framework for analyzing ex post facto violation claims.
81. See infra Part II for a discussion of the cases in which this argument was
confronted.
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The Ex Post Facto Prohibition

The United States Constitution prohibits both state and federal
legislatures from passing ex post facto laws. si Calier v. Bulls3 was
the first case in which the Supreme Court outlined the elements of a
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.84 Since Calder, the Clause
has been interpreted to prohibit legislative acts that operate to the
detriment85 of a defendant whose alleged crime was committed
before the legislative act was enacted. 86
In Weaver v. Graham, the Court provided two explicit pur
poses for prohibiting ex post facto laws: assuring "that legislative
Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely
on their meaning until explicitly changed,"87 and preventing "arbi
trary and potentially vindictive" legislative acts.88 The Court stated
that "[t]he critical question is whether the law changes the legal
82. See u.s. CaNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, regarding the federal government, providing
that: "No Bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CaNST. art. I,
§ 10, regarding state governments, providing that: "No state shall ... pass any Bill of
Attainder, [or] ex post facto Law ...."
83. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
84. In Calder, Justice Chase provided four characteristics of ex post facto laws:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.
3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict
the offender.
Id. at 390 (emphasis omitted).
85. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S.
282, 294 (1977); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937); Calder, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) at 390.
86. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29. For a general discussion of the ex post facto
clauses, see Derek J.T. Adler, Ex Post Facto Limitations on Changes in Evidentiary
Law: Repeal of Accomplice Corroboration Requirements, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1191,
1192-1201 (1987); see also William Winslow Crosskey, The True Meaning of the Consti
tutional Prohibition of Ex-Post-Facto Laws, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 539 (1947); Oliver P.
Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 MICH. L. REv. 315 (1922); Harold J. Krent,
The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO.
L.J. 2143 (1996); Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to What Constitutes an Ex Post
Facto Law Prohibited by Federal Constitution, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1146 (1978).
87. Id. at 28-29 (citing Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 298; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221,
229 (1883); Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 387).
88. Id. at 29 (citations omitted). Weaver involved a new Florida statute which
reduced the amount of "good time" credits a prisoner could earn for good conduct. See
id. at 26. Florida attempted to apply the statute to prisoners sentenced before its enact
ment. See id. at 27. The Supreme Court held that this retroactive application of the
new law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it made it more difficult for most
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consequences of acts completed before its effective date."89 Addi
tionally, the Weaver Court outlined two essential elements needed
for a law to violate the ex post facto prohibition. FIrst, "it must be
retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its
enactment .... "90 Second, "it must disadvantage the offender af
fected by it."91
The most recent Supreme Court cases concerning the Ex Post
Facto Clause have stated the Weaver test somewhat differently. In
Collins v. Youngblood,92 the Court focused its inquiry on whether
the legislation enacted after the defendant's conduct had been com
mitted retroactively altered the definition of the crime or increased
the corresponding punishment.93 Subsequently, in California De
partment of Co"ections v. Morales,94 the Court explicitly stated
that Collins had correctly expressed the ex post facto analytical
framework. 95 The Morales Court stated that "[a]fter Collins, the
focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative
change produces some ambiguous sort of 'disadvantage,' ... but on
whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or
increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable."96
inmates to accumulate credits. See iii. at 35-36. The Court stated that the law "con
stricts the inmate's opportunity to earn early release ...." Id.
89. Id. at 31. The Court also stated that "the ex post facto prohibition ... forbids
the imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by law when
the act[sJ to be punished occurred." Id. at 30.
90. Id. at 29.
91. Id. (citing Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397,401 (1937); Calder, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) at 390); accord Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,430 (1987).
92. 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
93. See iii. at 43. The Court in Collins made reference to language used in an
other Supreme Court ex post facto case, Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925). See iii. at
42. In defining the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Oause, the Beazell Court stated that:
It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well known that their citation
may be dispensed with, that any statute which punishes as a crime an act previ
ously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burden
some the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one
charged with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time
when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.
Beazell, 269 U.S. at 169-70.
94. 514 U.S. 499 (1995).
95. See iii. at 504 n.3.
96. Id. Although the Morales Court made it clear that this prong of the Court's
ex post facto test had been refined, it is not clear what impact, if any, the decision
actually had on its application. In Morales, the defendant was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for the murder of his wife, but was entitled to parole reviews annually
thereafter. See iii. at 503. California subsequently changed its law to authorize the
California Board of Prison Thrms to defer parole hearings for up to three years for
prisoners convicted of more than one offense involving the taking of a life. See iii. The
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Essentially, the Supreme Court's ex post facto analysis at
tempts to determine whether the law in question has made the pen
alty for a crime more severe subsequent to the time when that
crime was committed. In applying the test to the supervised release
cases, the courts of appeals deciding this issue have struggled with
the following question: to which "event" is the new law being ap
plied, the original offense or the violation of release? To resolve
this question, the courts have had to draw comparisons to other
lines of cases confronting similar ex post facto claims. The follow
ing section discusses these analogies.
D. Application of the Ex Post Facto Analysis: Parole Violation
and Repeat Offender Statutes
In examining the supervised release cases under the Supreme
Court's ex post facto analysis, the five courts of appeals that have
considered this issue have compared their cases to those involving
either parole violation or repeat offender statutes. 97 These two
lines of cases have involved similar ex post facto violation claims,
producing differing results. Consequently, the courts 'of appeals de
ciding the supervised release cases, by incorporating the reasoning
used in either the parole violation or repeat offender situations,
have reached conflicting conclusions.
defendant was later denied parole and, under the new law, the next review hearing was
set for three years later. See id.
The Court held that the mere increase in intervals between parole hearings did not
constitute an increase in punishment for ex post facto purposes. See id. at 1605. It
reasoned that the change in parole policies was done merely to avoid needless hearings
for prisoners who had "no reasonable chance of being released." See id. at 504. The
Court reached its conclusion without calling into question the holdings of Weaver and
Miller. Moreover, the Court's re-articulation of the ex post facto analysis involved only
the second half of the Weaver test, that focusing on whether the law in question "disad
vantaged" the defendant. Conversely, the issue examined in this Note does not involve
the question of whether the new supervised release provisions disadvantaged the de
fendants, but whether these provisions were retroactive. Consequently, the retroactiv
ity portion of the analysis, as stated in Weaver, remains pertinent to the issue discussed
in this Note.
The Supreme Court's most recent application of the ex post facto analysis appears
in the case of Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S. Ct. 891 (1997). In Lynce, the Court again dealt
with the issue of whether a newly enacted state statute "disadvantaged" a defendant by
increasing the punishment for the defendant's original crime. See id. at 895.
97. The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
have compared the supervised release statutes to those governing parole violations.
Only the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has decided that the repeat offender
analogy is more accurate. See infra Part II for a discussion of these cases.
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Statutes Governing Parole Violations

The courts of appeals that have found ex post facto violations
to exist in the supervised release cases have compared supervised
release to parole.98 These courts, in identifying similarities between
the two systems, have turned to ex post facto cases involving the
retroactive99 application of new parole violation statutes to support
their holdings. loo The parole violation cases prohibited retroactive
changes that imposed greater legal obstacles to early release, gener
ally through the forfeiture of "good-time" credits. lol
The principal case involving the retroactive application of al
tered parole violation statutes is Greenfield v. Scafati,l02 a case from
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
which the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. In Greenfield,
the defendant was sentenced to five to seven years in prison for his
original crime. 103 Under Massachusetts law at the time of sentenc
ing, prisoners could accumulate "good-conduct" credits while in
98. See United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1121 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that
"supervised release, like parole, is an integral part of the punishment for the underlying
offense"); United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873,881 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that parole
and supervised release "are virtually identical systems" in that under both, "a defendant
serves a portion of a sentence in prison and a portion under supervision outside prison
walls"); accord United States v. Beals, 87 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 1996).
In Meeks, the United States Court .pf Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowl
edged that supervised release and probation had been treated as being essentially
equivalent by both Congress and the Sentencing Commission. See Meeks, 25 F.3d at
1121. The Second Circuit then referred to the Supreme Court's opinion in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli,411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973), which stated, under due process analysis that there is
no constitutional difference between probation and parole. See id. Accordingly, the
Second Circuit concluded that there was "no persuasive reason to distinguish between
the standards of parole eligibility ... and the conditions for revocation of supervised
release." Meeks, 25 F.3d at 1121 (quoting United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523, 526
n.2 (4th Cir. 1992».
See infra Part II.A for a discussion of these and other cases relying on the similar
ity between parole and supervised release for the purposes of ex post facto analysis.
99. "Retroactive" has been defined as the "[p]rocess of acting with reference to
past occurrences." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1317 (6th ed. 1990). "Retroactive laws"
have been defined as "those which take away or impair vested rights acquired under
existing laws, create new obligations, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability in
respect to the transactions or considerations already past." Id.
100. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of these cases.
101. See Krent, supra note 86, at 2148-49 (providing a summary of major case law
addressing this issue). '''Good-time' credit is awarded for [an inmate's] good conduct
and reduces [the] period of [the] sentence which [the] prisoner must spend in prison
although it does not reduce the period of the sentence itself." BLACK'S LAW DICTION
ARY 694 (6th ed. 1990).
102. 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967) (three-judge court), affd mem., 390 U.S.
713 (1968).
103. See Greenfield, 277 F. Supp. at 644.
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prison, thereby advancing the date of release. 104 After the defend
ant's sentencing, the statute was amended whereby good-conduct
credits would be forfeited for parole violations. lOS The defendant
subsequently violated his parole, and was required to forfeit his
gOOd-conduct credits. 106
The district court held that the application of the new law vio
lated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it increased the punishment
of the defendant's original sentence. 107 As a result, courts have
held that statutes forfeiting good-time credits for parole violations
cannot be applied to defendants whose original offenses were com
mitted before the statute's enactment. lOS
2. Repeat Offender Statutes
The opposing position taken by the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that, for ex post facto purposes, supervised re
lease statutes are more akin to repeat offender, or recidivist stat
utes, which impose enhanced penalties on individuals who have
repeatedly committed crimes. l OO These statutes allow courts to con
sider crimes committed before the enactment of the recidivist stat
ute. 110 In holding that these statutes do not violate the Ex Post
104. See id.
105. See id. at 645.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 645-46. The district court in Greenfield stated that "[d]epriving one
of time off to which he was justly entitled as a practical matter results in extending his
sentence and increasing his punishment." Id. at 645 (quoting Lembersky v. Parole Bd.,
124 N.E.2d 521, 524 (Mass. 1955». The court added that depriving a prisoner of the
right to earn good-conduct credits "materially 'alters the situation of the accused to his
disadvantage.'" Id. at 646 (quoting In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890»; see also Warden
v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 663 (1974) (holding that parole eligibility is annexed to the
original sentence); Williams v. Lee, 33 F.3d 1010, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding un
constitutional the retroactive application of a new statute enhancing the penalties for
parole violations); Schwartz v. Muncy, 834 F.2d 396, 398 (4th Cir. 1987) (invalidating
the retroactive application of a new parole law which delayed an inmate's ability to earn
parole).
108. See, e.g., Fender v. Thompson, 883 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1989); Beebe v. Phelps,
650 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (per curium); Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648
(2d Cir. 1977).
109. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the argument that supervised release
statutes are similar to recidivist statutes for ex post facto purposes.
110. Recidivist statutes have been justified by the Supreme Court as deterring
repeat offenders and segregating from the rest of society those individuals who repeat
edly commit crimes over an extended period of time. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263,284-85 (1980) (defining the primary goals of recidivist statutes).
For various discussions of the treatment of repeat offender statutes by courts, see
Daniel Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BUFF. L. REv. 99
(1971); Michael Zebendilos Okpala, Repeat Offender Statutes-Do They Create a Sepa
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Facto Clause, courts have viewed the increased punishment as at
taching only to the defendant's most recent conduct, not the origi
nal offense. 111
The principal case upholding recidivist statutes against ex post
facto attack is Gryger v. Burke .112 In Gryger, the Supreme Court
upheld a life sentence for a defendant who was charged as a fourth
time offender, even though one of these crimes had been commit
ted before passage of the recidivist statute. 113 The Court stated that
"[t]he sentence as a fourth offender ... is not to be viewed as either
a new jeopardy or additional penalty for earlier crimes. It is a stiff
ened penalty for the latest crime .... "114
Courts have used the foregoing information for guidance in un
derstanding the nature of the supervised release system as well as in
addressing the ex post facto implications of applying the new statu
tory provisions. With a general understanding of supervised re
lease, the ex post facto prohibition, as well as the parole and repeat
offender lines of cases, the decisions of the United States courts of
appeals can more easily be understood and examined.
II.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE ALTERATION OF SUPERVISED
RELEASE STATUTES AND THE Ex POST FACTO
IMPLICATIONS

The current split in the United States courts of appeals con
cerning the application of the new supervised release statutes has
centered on how to characterize supervised release violation pun
ishments. More specifically, the courts of appeals have struggled
with the issue of what the punishment represents-a part of the
original sentence or a sentence in and of itself? In deciding this
rate Offense?, 32 How. L.J. 185 (1989); Jill C. Rafaloff, The Armed Career Criminal Act:
Sentence Enhancement Statute or New Offense?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (1988);
Harold Dubroff, Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 332 (1965); Note,
Court Treatment of General RecidiVist Statutes, 48 CoLUM. L. REv. 238 (1948); Note,
Recidivism and Virginia's "Come-Back" Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 597, 597-607 (1962).
111. See e.g., United States v. Ykema, 887 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Ilacqua, 562 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1977). This reasoning is consistent with early Supreme
Court decisions regarding the constitutionality of laws which provided enhanced pun
ishments for repeat offenders. See, e.g., Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 676 (1895)
(holding that the increased severity of the punishment is not a second punishment for
the same offense, but rather is a more severe punishment for a subsequent offense); see
also Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616
(1912); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901).
112. 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
113. See id. at 732.
114. Id.
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question, the courts of appeals have turned to various sources for
assistance, including the Sentencing Commission's policy state
ments as well as analogous interpretations of the Ex Post Facto
Clause in the cases involving parole violation and repeat offender
statutes.
A.

Supervised Release Violation Statutes: Continuing Punishment
for the Original Offense

In concluding that the application of the new statutory provi
sions concerning supervised release violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause, a number of courts of appeals have held that sanctions im
posed for supervised release violations constitute punishment for
the defendant's original crime. As a result, these courts have con
cluded that the provisions governing supervised release violations
cannot be altered after the defendant's original crime has been
committed. For example, in United States v. Paskow,115 the defend
ant pled guilty to conspiracy to receive the proceeds of a bank rob
bery and receiving the proceeds of a bank robbery, conduct which
was committed in May of 1988, and was sentenced to eight months
in prison and three years supervised release.1 16
When the defendant committed his crimes, 18 U.S.c.
§ 3583(e)(4) limited the length of imprisonment that could be im
posed upon the revocation of a term of supervised release, with the
length of any sentence under the maximum left to the judge's dis
cretion. 117 However, the enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988118 brought a new provision, section 3583(g), which required
mandatory terms of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised
release for possession of a controlled substance. 119 In 1990, the de
fendant in Paskow tested positive for marijuana and cocaine use. 120
As a result, the court revoked the defendant's supervised release
and, under the terms of section 3583(g), he was given the
mandatory prison sentence of twelve months, one-third of his term
of supervised release. l21
Under the former version of the statute, the sentencing court
115. 11 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993).
116. See id. at 875-76.
117. See id. at 876. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(4) was, at the end of 1988, redesignated
as 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (1994).
118. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7303(b)(2), 102 Stat. 4418, 4464 (1988).
119. See supra Part lB.3 for a discussion of § 3583(g).
120. See Paskow, 11 F.3d at 876.
121. See id.
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had the authority to exercise discretion upon revocation, in which
case the defendant in Paskow could possibly have received a
shorter term of imprisonment, or no term at all. l22 Consequently,
the defendant argued that the application of section 3583(g) to his
conduct violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it altered the
punishment imposed for a crime which had been committed before
the statute's enactment. 123
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit agreed for two reasons. First, the court, applying the
Supreme Court's ex post facto analysis,124 stated that application of
the amended statute "disadvantaged" the defendant because it
changed the defendant's eligibility to receive a lesser sentence. l25
Second, and more importantly, the court concluded that the sanc
tions imposed for supervised release violations constituted a por
tion of the sentence for the defendant's original crime and therefore
the violation itself could not be considered a new offense for ex
post facto purposes. l26 Accordingly, the court held that the applica
tion of the terms of the amended statute retroactively applied to
conduct committed before the enactment of the statute, thereby vi
olating the Ex Post Facto Clause.127
Perhaps the most crucial part of the court's analysis in Paskow
was the comparison of supervised release to parole. l28 The court
relied on Greenfield v. Sca/ati,129 which struck down a similar appli
cation of an amended parole violation statute under the Ex Post
Facto Clause. 130 The court in Paskow concluded that, for ex post
facto purposes, parole and supervised release were equivalent, and
therefore Greenfield controlled the outcome.l3l The court stressed
122. See itt.
123. See itt.
124. See supra Part I.e and accompanying notes for a discussion of the Supreme
Court's method of ex post facto analysis.
125. See Paskow, 11 F.3d at 877 (citing Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401
02 (1937».
126. See itt. at 883.
127. See itt.
128. See itt. at 877-82.
129. 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967) (three-judge court), affd mem., 390 U.S.
713 (1968). See supra Part I.D.1 for a discussion of Greenfield and the retroactive ap
plication of amended parole violation statutes.
130. See Paskow, 11 F.3d at 878.
131. See itt. at 880. The court stated that the parole and supervised release sys
tems are both forms of post-imprisonment supervision. In both cases, it is the original
sentence which determines how long the term will be and establishes the punishment
for revocation upon violation. Conduct which violates terms of both supervised release
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that the parole cases have consistently recognized parole eligibility
as being an inherent part of the original sentence for the original
crime because the "terms and conditions [of parole eligibility] are
fixed at the moment the underlying offense is complete. "132 Adher
ing to this reasoning, the Paskow court concluded that like the con
ditions affecting parole eligibility, the terms and conditions· of
supervised release cannot be retrospectively altered. 133
Additionally, the Paskow court looked to the language of the
statute governing supervised release to support the conclusion that
terms of supervised release relate to the original sentence. The
court stated that section 3583(a), which allowed the sentencing
court to impose a term of supervised release, contained the lan
guage: "may include as part of the sentence the requirement that the
defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprison
ment."I34 The court also considered the language of the Sentencing
Guidelines, which treats supervised release as part of the original
sentence to be imposed at the time of sentencing.135
The Paskow court also referred to a previous Fourth Circuit
decision, United States v. Parriett. l36 In Parriett, the court found
that the application of section 3583(g) to a defendant who commit
ted his original crime before that section's enactment violated the
and parole "simply triggers the execution of the conditions of the original sentence."
Id. at 881.
Not mentioned by the Ninth Circuit in Paskow was the case of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, '.
411 U.S. 778 (1973). In Gagnon, the Supreme Court stated that "[d]espite the un
doubted minor differences between probation and parole, the commentators have
agreed that revocation of probation where sentence has been imposed previously is
constitutionally indistingt!ishable from the revocation of parole." Gagnon, 411 U.S. at
782 n.3.
132. Paskow, 11 F.3d at 879.
133. See iii. at 878-79 (citing Fender v. Thompson, 883 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1989);
Schwartz v. Muncy, 834 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1987); Beebe v. Phelps, 650 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.
Unit A July 1981); Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1977». In Beebe, the Court
of Appeals for the FIfth Circuit stated that "[t]he practical effect [of applying the
amended parole revocation statute] is a statutory increase in punishment for the first
offense, enacted subsequent to the commission of the offense." Beebe, 650 F.2d at 776.
134. Paskow, 11 F.3d at 882. Section 3583(a) states: "The court, in imposing a
sentence to a term of imprisonment for a felony or misdemeanor, may include as part of
the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised re
lease after imprisonment ...." 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (1994).
135. See iii. The Sentencing Guidelines state: "A term of supervised release may
be imposed by the court as a part of the sentence of imprisonment at the time of initial
sentencing." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL, ch. 7, pt. A (1995). See supra
notes 35-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the imposition of supervised
release.
136. 4 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1992).
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Ex Post Facto Clause. 137 The Parriett court based its decision pri
marily on the holding of Fender v. Thompson,138 a case in which the
application of a revised statute regarding parole eligibility was
found to have violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 139
The Fourth Circuit in Paskow also cited United States v.
Flora,140 a case from the United States District Court for the West
ern District of Kentucky. In Flora, the district court relied on the
holding in Parriett, the language of section 3583 itself, as well as the
Sentencing Guidelines in concluding that "supervised release, and
the possibility of revocation and· additional imprisonment, are as
much the consequence of the offender's underlying crime as is the
initial term of imprisonment. "141 Thereafter, the court in Flora
found that the application of section 3583(g) to the defendant
would retroactively alter the punishment relating to the original of
fense, thereby constituting an ex post facto violation. 142
Both the Second and Seventh Circuits raised another argument
for finding an ex post facto violation in the supervised release cases.
These courts of appeals found it significant that the conduct consti
tuting supervised release violations is often not criminal and, there
fore, punishment for such violations must be a part of the
punishment for the original crime. 143 United States v. Beals, a Sev
137. See itl. at 526.
138. 883 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1989).
139. See Parrietl, 974 F.2d at 526. In Fender, the defendant was found guilty of
various crimes and was sentenced to life imprisonment. See Fender, 883 F.2d at 304. At
the time these crimes were committed, Vtrginia law allowed the defendant to become
eligible for parole after serving fifteen years of the sentence. See itl. Vtrginia later
amended its parole eligibility statute to declare all persons sentenced to life imprison
ment who escape from a correctional facility ineligible for parole. See itl. The defend
ant escaped and was later recaptured. See itl. His parole eligibility was revoked
pursuant to the revised statute. See itl. In finding an ex post facto violation, the Fourth
Circuit stated that the application of the revised statute in this case constituted a "post
hoc alteration of the punishment for an earlier offense." [d. at 306-07. The court spe
cifically rejected the argument that no ex post facto violation should be found because
the defendant was "on notice" of the change in the law. See itl. The court reasoned
that "the challenged statute nevertheless accomplished an impermissible enhancement
of the punishment for an earlier, unrelated crime." [d. at 307.
140. 810 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
141. [d. at 843.
142. See itl. at 843-44.
143. See United States v. Beals, 87 F.3d 854,859-60 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
because a supervised release violation many times will not constitute illegal conduct in
and of itself, the punishment imposed for such conduct must be linked to the original
offense for ex post facto purposes); see also United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1122
(2d Cir. 1994) (stating that "[i)f the individual may be punished for an action that is not
of itself a crime, the rationale must be that the punishment is part of the sanction for the
original conduct that was a crime").
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enth Circuit case, involved the application of 18 U.S.c. § 3583(h),
which authorized the imposition of an additional term of supervised
release following revocation and imprisonment, to a defendant sen
tenced before that statute's enactment. l44 The Seventh Circuit,
combining the parole analogy with the non-criminal argument, con
cluded that punishments imposed for violations of both parole and
supervised release are inevitably tied to the defendant's original
criminal conduct. 145
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Meeks, also reasoned
that proceedings regarding supervised release violations are not
subject to the same constitutional protections that would apply if
such violations were deemed new criminal offenses. l46 Particularly,
The Beals court identified failure to support dependents, failure to work conscien
tiously, and failure to undergo medical treatment as examples of non-criminal super
vised release violations. See Beals, 87 F.3d at 859-60.
144. See Beals, 87 F.3d at 856. To demonstrate how the imposition of subsection
(h) disadvantaged the defendant, the Beals court provided a hypothetical. A defendant
is convicted of a felony and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment to be followed by a
three-year term of supervised release. The defendant serves his prison time and is re
leased, but one year into his term, he commits a violation. Prior to the enactment of
subsection (h), the maximum penalty a court could impose in this situation, under sub
section (b)(3), was two years imprisonment. After serving that sentence, the govern
ment's supervision of the defendant would end. However, with the enactment of
subsection (h), the court has the authority to sentence a defendant to a combination of
imprisonment and supervised release over those two years-for example, one year in
prison and one year on supervised release. If the defendant subsequently commits a
violation during this second term of release, the court has the authority to send the
defendant back to prison for up to one year (the two-year maximum less the one-year
term of imprisonment already served). Consequently, the defendant's total punishment
would equal two and a half years after the initial revocation of supervised release (the
one year in prison, the six months on supervised release, and then another year in
prison). The Beals court concluded that this total was six months longer than that
which would have been allowed before the enactment of subsection (h). See iii. at 858.
But see supra note 9 for citation of cases in which application of subsection (h) was
found not to disadvantage defendants sentenced prior to the enactment of subsection
(h).
145. See Beals, 87 F.3d at 859-60. The Beals court also disposed of the theory that
punishment for supervised release violations is identical to situations where punishment
is imposed against defendants who have repeatedly committed crimes under recidivist
laws. See iii. at 859. In cases involving repetitive criminal behavior, courts have been
allowed to use prior offenses, despite the existence of ex post facto claims, to punish
defendants more severely for their most recent crimes. See supra Part I.D.2 for a dis
cussion of recidivist statutes. The Beals court distinguished these cases in stating that
"[t]he increased punishment imposed under a recidivist statute is triggered by subse
quent conduct that is itself a crime. The government punishes that conduct because of
its nature, not because of the ... original offense. Therefore, it is logical to link the
increased punishment only to the SUbsequent conduct for ex post facto purposes."
Beals, 87 F.3d at 859.
146. See Meeks, 25 F.3d at 1122.
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these proceedings are not governed by the right to a jury trial or the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.147 The Meeks court
stated that "[these] constitutional protections have been ruled inap
plicable because the conduct that violates the conditions of super
vised release is not viewed as a separate criminal offense."148
Because the supervised release violation did not constitute a new
offense, the court reasoned that application of new statutory provi
sions has the effect of changing the legal consequences of acts com
pleted before the statute's effective date to the defendant's
disadvantage. 149
B. Supervised Release Violation Statutes: Punishment for a New
Offense
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, con
trary to the holdings of four other courts of appeals, held that the
application of the new statutory provision governing supervised re
lease violations did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because
147. See id. (citing United States v. Grisanti, 4 F.3d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1993);
United States v. Hanahan, 798 F.2d 187,189 (7th Cir. 1986); Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d
1303, 1305, 1307 (9th Cir. 1977».
The court's reasoning relies on the fact that, for revocation purposes, violations of
supervised release and probation have been treated virtually the same by both Con
gress and the Sentencing Commission. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (1994) (instructing
the court, in determining the need for revocation of supervised release, to adhere to the
"Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to revocation of probation"); see also
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL, ch. 7, pt. B, introductory commentary (1995)
(stating that "[b]ecause these policy statements focus on the violation of the court-or
dered supervision, this chapter ... treats violations of the conditions of probation and
supervised release as functionally equivalent"). See supra notes 48-53 and accompany
ing text for a discussion of supervised release revocation hearings. Moreover, probation
revocation hearings are not criminal proceedings, and, therefore, not all constitutional
procedural protections apply. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984);
see also Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28, 29-30 (1985) (no double jeopardy
protection); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-89 (1973) (stating that probation
revocation is not a stage of criminal prosecution); Morgan v. Wainwright, 676 F.2d 476,
478-79 (11th Cir. 1982) (no right to jury determination).
Therefore, the argument maintains that because new crimes require full constitu
tional protection, the punishments imposed for supervised release violations would also
have to be accompanied by the same procedural protections in order to avoid an ex
post facto violation. Because supervised release violation proceedings do not require
full procedural protection, punishments for supervised release violations must be linked
to the original crime. Consequently, amended punishments may not be imposed upon
defendants who were sentenced under the former version of the law. See Meeks, 25
F.3d at 1122-23.
148. Meeks, 25 F.3d at 1123. The court went on to state that "any enhancement
of the punishment for the supervised-release violation should be viewed primarily as an
enhancement of the penalties for the past acts, rather than for the subsequent acts." [d.
149. See id. at 1120. See also Beals, 87 F.3d at 860.
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the violation constituted a new criminal offense, one committed af
ter the statute's enactment. In United States v. Reese,150 the defend
ant was convicted of participating in a conspiracy to distribute
cocaine in November of 1988 and was sentenced to 33 months of
imprisonment to be followed by a five year term of supervised re
lease. 151 Like the defendants in the other supervised release cases,
terms of imprisonment after revocation were limited under section
3583(e)4).152 However, after the enactment of section 3583(g), the
defendant in Reese was subject to the mandatory prison term of not
less than one-third of the term of supervised release for any viola
tion involving possession of a controlled substance. 153 From 1991 to
1992, while on supervised release, the defendant repeatedly tested
positive for cocaine use. l54 Consequently, applying the new statute,
the court revoked the defendant's term of supervised release and
sentenced him to the statutory minimum term of imprisonment. 155
The Sixth Circuit held that the application of section 3583(g)
did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 156 In reaching this conclu
sion, the court challenged the principal arguments relied upon by
the other courts of appeals in finding an ex post facto violation.
First, the Reese court disagreed with the contention that parole and
supervised release were equivalent. 157 It stated that unlike parole,
terms of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised re
lease were not limited to the terms allowable under the original of
fense. 158 The court added that "it is possible that an individual will
have already served the maximum prison sentence allowed under
the guidelines ... [and] a [subsequent] violation of that supervised
release, even in the final days of the release period, could result in
150. 71 F.3d 582 (6th CiT. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2529 (1996).
151. See id. at 584.
152. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(4) (1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3) (1994».
153. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (1988) (amended 1994».
154. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 584.
155. See id. The statutory minimum prison term for the defendant in Reese was
twenty months. See id.
156. See id. at 591.
157. See id. at 587-88.
158. See id. at 587. It should be noted that while the court appeared to be con
trasting supervised release and parole at this point in its analysis, it used the terms
probation and parole interchangeably. See id. The court noted that under 18 U.S.c.
§ 3565 (1994), terms of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of probation are limited
to the term allowable under the original offense. See id. (emphasis added). Thus, it
appears that the court's objective was to distinguish supervised release from both pa
role and probation~
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additional prison time."159 Consequently, the Reese court reasoned
that violations of supervised release could produce a "cumulative
punishment that exceeds the original prison sentence."160 In sup
port of this conclusion, the court quoted United States v. Wright,161
a prior Sixth Circuit case, for the proposition that "[c]onnecting the
resentencing period with the maximum period of incarceration al
lowed for the original offense would undermine the system of su
pervised -rele~se . . .."162
,
In finding an "inherent difference" between supervised release
and parole, Jhe court dismissed the analogies made by the other
circuits. 163 In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to the lan
guage of the Sentencing Commission contrasting parole and super
vised release. l64 The court also distinguished this case from
Greenfield v. Scafati,165 stating that Greenfield involved an altera
tion- of the defendant's original sentence while the present case in
volved the alteration of the punishment for a new offense, the
violation of supervised release, occurring after -the date of
alteration.166
159. Id. at 588.
160. Id. (citing United States v. Smeathers, 930 F.2d 18, 19 (8th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Dillard, 910 F.2d 461, 466-67 (7th Cir. 1990». To demonstrate the difference,
the court provided the example of a defendant sentenced to nine years in prison and
released on parole after three years. A violation of that parole could result in a maxi
mum term of imprisonment of six years. Under the supervised release system, the de
fendant could receive additional prison time, regardless of the amount of time already
served. See id. at 587-88. The court added that if the system was structured otherwise,
"a person on supervised release could violate his release conditions with impunity if he
had already served his full original sentence." Id. at 588; see also United States v.
Robinson, 62 F.3d 1282, 1285-86 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that a term of imprisonment
imposed upon revocation of supervised release, when combined with the time a defend
ant has already served in prison, may exceed the maximum prison term allowed under
the statute giving rise to the original crime).
161. 2 F.3d 175, 179 (6th Cir. 1993).
162. Reese, 71 F.3d at 588. The court in Wright added that "[t]he possibility of
reincarceration for violation of a condition of supervised release is a cornerstone of the
sentencing structure." Wright, 2 F.3d at 179 (quoting United States v. Stephenson, 928
F.2d 728, 730-31 (6th Cir. 1991)}.
163. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 587-88.
164. See id. at 587.
165. 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967) (three-judge court), affd mem., 390 U.S.
713 (1968).
166. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 590. Specifically, the Reese court stated that Greenfield
stood for the notion that rules governing good-time credits could not be altered and
applied to individuals serving a prison sentence for their original crime (which occurred
before the enactment of the new rule). The Reese court argued that, to the contrary,
the defendant in its case was not serving additional time for his original offense under
the new statute, but for the violation of release. See supra Part 1.0.1 for a discussion of
Greenfield.
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Second, the Sixth Circuit found that the penalties imposed for
supervised release violations were not connected to the original of
fense. The court compared the supervised release violation statutes
to recidivist laws which have long been upheld against ex post facto
attack.t 67 The court reasoned that, like recidivist statutes, statutes
governing supervised release violations punish the most recent of
fense, not the original. l68 The punishment which accompanied that
new offense was enhanced because of the defendant's prior his
tory.169 Accordingly, the court held that the alteration and applica
tion of statutes governing supervised release violations in these
cases did not constitute an ex post facto violation because the new
statutory punishment was enacted before the defendant's miscon
duct had taken place. 170 The court further stated that its reasoning
was consistent with the Supreme Court's ex post facto analysis in
that the amended statute did not increase the punishment assigned
to the original crime. l71
167. See iii. at 588. See supra Part I.D.2 for a discussion of recidivist statutes and
the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit was the only court to compare the supervised re
lease cases to a line of cases involving 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1326 (1994». See Reese, 71 F.3d at 589. In these cases, an illegal alien commit
ted some offense and, as a result, was deported. See id. After deportation, Congress
enacted a new statute which imposed a greater punishment for any alien who had com
mitted an "aggravated felony" and who later illegally reentered the country. See iii.
The alien would then reenter the country and would be sentenced under the new stat
ute. See id. In upholding this law against ex post facto attack, several courts of appeals
have held that "the enhanced punishment simply was not 'for the earlier offense' even
though the punishment was a 'but for' consequence of that earlier offense." Reese, 71
F.3d at 589 (citing United States v. Cole, 32 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Saenz-Forero, 27 F.3d 1016 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Arzate-Nunez, 18 F.3d 730
(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Forbes, 16 F.3d 1294 (1st Cir. 1994».
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Arzate-Nunez, explicitly distin
guished the supervised release statute at issue in United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873
(9th Cir. 1993), from the statute at issue in its case. See Arzate-Nunez, 18 F.3d at 735.
The court stated that an ex post facto violation was found in Paskow because of the
"integral relationship [between the statute governing supervised release violations and]
... the defendant's predicate offense." Id. It added that the defendant in its case was,
"unlike the defendant in Paskow, ... being punished for a new offense, reentering the
country." Id. It stressed the lack of procedural protection afforded defendants in su
pervised release violation proceedings as opposed to the protection afforded the de
fendant in its case. Id. The Ninth Circuit in Arzate-Nunez concluded that the statute at
issue was more analogous to repeat offender laws because the defendant's reentry con
stituted a new offense "for due process purposes, and also for ex post facto purposes."
Id.
168. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 590.
169. See iii. at 588.
170. See iii. at 590.
171. See iii. at 590-91. The court stated that the defendant was given "fair warn
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The Sixth Circuit in Reese also dismissed the argument that the
application of the amended supervised release statutes implicated
the Ex Post Facto Clause because violations of supervised release
were not subject to full constitutional procedural protection. l12 The
court stated that no other cases confronting ex post facto violation
claims had ever considered this issue in determining the existence
of a violation.173 Additionally, the court stated that similarly re
laxed procedural protections currently existed in cases involving
prison misconduct punishments, and that courts had not found ex
post facto violations to exist where those regulations had been en
acted after the defendant's original crime had been committed. 174
ing" of the amended statute's effect. In using this language, the court was making refer
ence to the purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause as outlined in both Weaver v. Graham,
450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981), and Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987). See Reese, 71
F.3d at 590. It also stated that their conclusion was consistent with Collins v. Young
blood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990), and California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 115 S. Ct.
1597 (1995) in that the amended statute did not increase the penalty for the defendant's
original offense. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 590-91. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of
these cases which outline the Supreme Court's ex post facto analysis and provide the
purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
The court clarified its pOSition by stating that the new statutory provisions affected
all individuals who had committed the same original offense as the defendant equally.
See Reese, 71 F.3d at 590. In other words, it was not until the defendant violated his
release that the new statutory provision was applied. The court concluded that because
the punishment at issue did not reach every prisoner who had committed the same
earlier conduct, "it [could] hardly be logically argued that the punishment [was] being
imposed 'because of the earlier conduct." Id. See infra Part I1I.C for an analysis of
this argument.
172. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 589. See supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the procedural protection argument.
173. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 589.
174. See id. at 590 (citing Gilbert v. Peters, 55 F.3d 237, 239 (7th Cir. 1995); Ewell
v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482,485 (4th Cir. 1993». Both Gilbert and Ewell involved the enact
ment of prison regulations requiring inmates to provide blood samples before final dis
charge, parole, or release. Failure or refusal to do so would result in a loss of good-time
credit. Inmates who were imprisoned before these regulations went into effect argued
that requiring them to comply would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it would
retroactively alter the good-time accumulation system. See Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 238;
Ewell, 11 F.3d at 485.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Circuits did not
find ex post facto violations in these cases. Both courts of appeals held that the statutes
in question constituted reasonable prison regulations which were not penal in nature.
See Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 238-39; Ewell, 11 F.3d at 484. "Penal" has been defined as
"[p]unishable; inflicting a punishment; containing a penalty, or relating to a penalty."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1132 (6th ed. 1990). Because the enforcement of these stat
utes did not constitute additional punishment, they could be applied to all inmates,
regardless of when these inmates were sentenced. See Ewell, 11 F.3d at 485. In Gilbert,
the Seventh Circuit stated that" '[c]hanges in conditions of confinement ... and denials
of privileges-matters which every prisoner can anticipate are contemplated by his
original admission to prison-are necessarily functions of prison management.... Gil
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The conclusions reached by the varying courts of appeals are a
reflection of, for the most part, their opinions as to which analogy is
most accurate. Four courts of appeals held that applying the new
provisions retroactively alters a defendant's punishment, analogous
to the parole cases. Conversely, the Sixth Circuit held that the new
statutory provisions regarding supervised release violations provide
enhanced punishment fQr the most recent ,conduct, the violation.
For this reason, the Sixth' Circuit concluded that these provisions
should be considered the same as recidivist statutes under ex post
facto analysis. The following section questions the Sixth Circuit's
decision.

III.

LEGAL. ANALYSIS

The Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Reese created a
circuit split by characterizing supervised release violations as in
dependent offenses for the purposes of ex post facto analysis, sepa
rate from the original conduct that gave rise to the imposition of the
supervised release term.t 75 The court in Reese did not accept the
interpretation that sanctions imposed for supervised release viola
tions were inherently part of the sentence for the crime that was
committed before the statutory amendments went into effect.176
Rather, the court viewed defendants violating conditions of super
vised release as being equivalent to repeat offenders. 177 As a result,
the court concluded that the punishment imposed for violations of
bert, 55 F.3d at 239 (quoting Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 1992)). In
Ewell, the Fourth Circuit added that prison regulations "are not frozen at the time Qf
each inmate's conduct, but rather, they may be subject to reasonable amendments as
necessary for good prison administration ... without implicating ex post facto con
cerns." Ewell, 11 F.3d at 485-86.
The Fourth Circuit also reasoned that, unlike several of the parole cases involving
the alteration of rules governing good-time accumulation, specifically Weaver v. Gra
ham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), the prison regulation statutes did not effect the structure of the
good-time system. See Ewell, 11 F.3d at 486-87. Rather, the regulations in question
would result in a loss of good-time credits only if an infraction were to take place. All
such infractions would have occurred after the enactment of the regulations. See iii. at
487.
From the reasoning used in these cases, the court in Reese concluded that "[i]f
relaxed standards for punishment ... could only be justified by being subsumed under
the rubric of the original sentence, it would never be possible to impose prison miscon
duct punishments ... on prisoners violating rules enacted after the beginning of their
sentences, even where they had full notice of proscribed behavior." Reese, 71 F.3d at
590.
175. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 590.
176. See iii. at 590-91.
177. See iii. at 588.
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release sanctioned only the defendant's most recent conduct.178
At the heart of the Sixth Circuit's decision are two critical find
ings. First, the court found that the sanction imposed for violating
conditions of supervised release did not constitute a component of a
defendant's original sentence. Second, the court found that viola
tions of supervised release could be deemed equivalent to the
crimes that are subjected to enhanced punishments under repeat
offender laws. Because the Sixth Circuit stands alone in its reason
ing as well as in its characterization of supervised release violations,
this analysis examines these findings as well as the other principal
conclusions upon which the court relied. More specifically, this
analysis offers reasons to question the Sixth Circuit's holding in
Reese regarding the ex post facto implications of applying the
amended supervised release statutory provisions.
A.

The Supervised Release Violation: A New Offense, A Separate
Punishment

The most prominent assertion made by the Sixth Circuit in its
opinion in United States v. Reese was that a defendant who has vio
lated a condition of supervised release has committed a new offense
and, as a result, receives a new sentence attributable to this most
recent conduct.179 A key fact relied upon by the court regarding
this point was that imprisonment and supervised release constitute
separate forms of punishment imposed for a defendant's original
crime. 180 It added that the punishment imposed for a violation of
supervised release can often result in a cumulative prison sentence
that exceeds the maximum sentence allowed for the original of
fense. 181 As a result, the court concluded that the sanction imposed
for a violation of release must be connected to that violation only,
not to the original crime. l82
The Sixth Circuit correctly stated that courts impose super
vised release in addition to imprisonment and that the length of the
prison term imposed for a violation can exceed that of the maxi
mum term allowed for the original offense. 183 However, the court
concluded that because defendants, upon violating the terms of
178. See id. at 590.
179. See id. at 587-88.
180. See id. at 587.
181. See id. at 588.
182. See id.
183. See supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of
supervised release in sentencing.
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their release, could receive more total prison time than that which
could have been imposed for their original crimes, the additional
prison time had to be linked to a new offense-the violation of re
lease. 184 This conclusion conflicts with the nature of the supervised
release as described in the legislative history, as articulated by stat
ute, and also with the views of the Sentencing Commission, all of
which suggest that supervised release violations are not to be con
sidered new substantive offenses for purposes of ex post facto
analysis.
Although certainly not conclusive, the legislative history of the
supervised release system indicates that the Sixth Circuit's charac
terization of supervised release violations placed much more signifi
cance on the conduct constituting the violation than was ever
intended. When initially outlining what was to become the new sys
tem of supervised release, the Senate Judiciary Committee used the
term "contempt" to describe the status of a defendant who had vio
lated release. 1ss In fact, originally, the Committee did not intend to
establish revocation proceedings for supervised release violations
because it believed that "a minor violation of a condition of super
vised release should [not] result in resentencing of the defendant
and because ... a more serious violation should be dealt willi as a
new offense."186 Instead, courts were to respond to such violations
by modifying the conditions of release. 187 Apparently, when Con
gress developed the supervised release system, it did not intend for
the modification of conditions, what it considered to be the appro
priate "punishment" for supervised release violations, to be
deemed a new sentence-separate and distinct from the one origi
nally imposed. To the contrary, violations of release were intended
to bring about a restructuring of the conditions that were estab
lished as part of the defendant's original sentence. Thus, in order to
attach the punishment imposed under the new provision to the con
duct occurring after the enactment of that provision, the Sixth Cir
cuit in Reese had to substantially amplify the significance of the
conduct constituting the violation.
The language used by Congress in the statute authorizing the
imposition of supervised release also suggests that the term of im
prisonment imposed for the original crime, combined with the term
184.
185.
3308.
186.
187.

See Reese, 71 F.3d at 588.
See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 125 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3308.
See id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3308.
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of release, constitutes a single product of the same "event"-the
sentencing court's scrutiny of the original crime.1 88 Because the
statute allows the sentencing court to include a term of release "as
part of the sentence" for the original crime, it requires the sentenc
ing court to consider many of the same factors that it must also
weigh in determining sentences for crimes in general. 189 This lan
guage indicates that when a defendant receives a sentence for a
crime, consisting of a term of imprisonment to be followed by a
term of supervised release, the sentencing court has concluded that
the circumstances surrounding the defendant's commission of that
crime has created a need for additional punishment-the term of
release. Just as the term of release represents a component of the
defendant's original sentence, so too does the possibility of reim
prisonment for violating a condition of that release. Stated differ
ently, the rules and conditions of supervised release, as well as the
attached punishments, flow directly from the sentencing court's de
termination of the original sentence.1OO Reimprisonment for violat
ing release does serve as an enhanced punishment, in a sense, but
for the original crime. Consequently, any alteration of the provi
sions governing the imposition of this punishment, after a defend
ant has been sentenced for his original crime, has the direct effect of
altering the defendant's original sentence.
The Sentencing Commission's view further supports the idea
that supervised release violations are not to be considered new sub
stantive offenses for ex post facto purposes. 191 The Commission,
188. In 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (1994), Congress states that "[t]he court, in imposing
a sentence to a tenn of imprisonment for a felony or misdemeanor, may include as part
of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a tenn of supervised
release after imprisonment .... tt Id. (emphasis added).
189. See id. § 3583(c) (requiring the court, in detennining whether to include a
tenn of supervised release, to consider the factors set forth in § 3553(a». See supra
note 38 (discussing these factors).
190. Congress stated that a principal reason for developing the supervised release
system was to enable sentencing courts to meet the needs of individual defendants. See
S. REp. No. 98-225, at 124 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3307. Accordingly,
courts have been given the authority to consider the circumstances surrounding the
original crime in detennining the need for a supervised release tenn. See id., reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3307; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (providing the factors to be
considered in including a tenn of supervised release). It is difficult to reconcile this
intent with the Sixth Circuit's assertion that supervised release, and its accompanying
provisions, are not connected to the original sentence for ex post facto purposes.
191. The Sentencing Commission's view was first cited by the United States Dis
trict Court for the Western District of Kentucky in United States V. Flora, 810 F. Supp.
841,843 (W.O. Ky. 1993). See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text for a discus
sion of Flora. Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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after deliberation, concluded that a violation of release should be
considered a "breach of trust. "192 The punishment for the breach
would be imposed by courts only to sanction the defendant for fail
ing to abide by the release conditions, not to provide punishment
for any new criminal conduct. 193 Punishment for new criminal con
duct constituting a violation of release would be left to the court
having jurisdiction over that offense.194
Indeed, the Commission expressly rejected the view that sanc
tions imposed for supervised release violations and punishment for
the new offenses be determined simultaneously.195 Following the
approach selected by the Commission, a defendant's violation of
release constitutes a breach of the terms of a trust relationship-a
relationship established at the time the defendant's original sen
tence is determined and imposed. Accordingly, the violation of re
lease, standing on its own as a "breach of trust," does not serve as
the basis for a new criminal punishment, as the Sixth Circuit asserts
in Reese. Conversely, the violation of release, rather than giving
rise to new criminal sanctions, serves as a triggering mechanism for
a punishment previously established as part of the sentence for the
original crime.
B. Supervised Release Violation Statutes as Repeat Offender
Laws

The Sixth Circuit did not find it necessary to examine the in
tent of Congress or the views of the Sentencing Commission. In
stead, the court invoked an argument that had previously been
rejected by other courts. 196 The court concluded that the imposi~
cited the reasoning of Flora in United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 1993).
See supra notes 115-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of Paskow.
192. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANuAL, ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b). See supra Part
I.B.2 for a discussion of the Sentencing Commission's decision to treat violations of
supervised release as a "breach of trust." In Flora, the district court stated that "[t]he
Guidelines therefore suggest that the parolee's misconduct might result not only in rev
ocation of release but also in a subsequent, independent criminal prosecution." Flora,
810 F. Supp. at 843.
193. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b).
194. See id.
195. See id. The Commission's principal reason for rejecting this view was its fear
that this practice would lead to duplicated efforts among the different courts whereby
the punishment for the violation would have often been subsumed in the sentence im
posed for the new conduct itself. See id. See supra note 68 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the reasons the Commission offered for reaching this decision.
196. See, e.g., United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting
the argument that an "amended statute [did] not increase the penalty for a prior crime,
but rather enhance[d] the penalty for the revocation behavior"); Fender v. Thompson,
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tion of additional prison time for violations of release mirrored the
imposition of more severe punishments under repeat offender
laws. 197 According to the court, in both situations, harsher penal
ties are imposed for a defendant's most recent conduct. This asser
tion stretches the repeat offender analogy too far.
In comparing the supervised release violation statutes to repeat
offender laws, the Sixth Circuit conveyed the notion that a defend
ant who has yet to be convicted of any crime -may be sentenced for
a violation as if already deemed guilty of an offense. 198 However, a
ffuding that a defendant has violated conditions of supervised re
lease is not necessarily a finding that that defendant has committed
a new crime. 199 Alleged violators of release are not afforded full
criminal proceedings.2°O Violation hearings are designed only to
determine whether a defendant has violated the terms of release by
a preponderance of the evidence. These proceedings do not estab
lish a defendant's guilt in connection with a new crime. They only
serve to establish that a defendant has violated the terms of release
and therefore requires sanctioning for that violation. 201 .
.On the other hand, repeat offender laws, upon which the Sixth
Circuit heavily relies, impose enhanced punishments for repetitive
criminal conduct.202 Under these laws, defendants are convicted of
883 F.2d 303, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Schwartz v. Muncy, 834 F.2d 396 (4th Cir.
1987) (rejecting the argument that an amended parole statute imposed enhanced pun
ishments in the same manner as recidivist statutes); see also United States v. Beals, 87
F.3d 854, 859-60 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the recidivist statute argument asserted by
the Sixth Circuit in Reese).
197. See United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582, 588 (6th Cir. 1995), cen. denied, 116
S. a. 2529 (1996). See supra Part I.D.2 for a discussion of repeat offender statutes.
198. The Sixth Circuit asserted that violators of supervised release receive en
.
hanced punishments for their most recent conduct. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 590. Again, it
is difficult to reconcile this view with the fact that supervised release violations are not
"crimes." By deeming supervised release violations as independent, punishable of
fenses, the Sixth Circuit suggests that criminal penalties may· be imposed for conduct
not constituting a crime. See supra notes 48-53, 146-48 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the procedural setting of supervised release violation proceedings.
199. In fact, the conduct constituting a violation of release is often not criminal in
and of itself. For example, violations of release can include failing to support depen
dents or failing to maintain suitable employment. See Beals, 87 F.3d at 859-60. See
supra notes 48-53,146-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nature of super
vised release violation proceedingS.
200. See supra notes 48-53, 146-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
nature of supervised release violation proceedings.
201. See supra notes 48-53, 146-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
nature of supervised release viol.ation proCeedings.
202. The Seventh Circuit in Beals emphasized this point. See Beals, 87 F.3d at
859. The court in Beals stated that "[t]he increased punishment imposed under a recidi
vist statute is triggered by subsequent conduct that is itself a crime. The government
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wholly new crimes and are given enhanced sentences in light of
their history of criminal behavior. Courts have not found ex post
facto violations in the repeat offender cases because the enhanced
punishment is seen as a statutorily authorized punishment for
crimes committed after the date of the statute's enactment.203 As
the Supreme Court in Gryger v. Burke stated, the enhanced sen
tence "is a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered
to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one."204 The Sixth
Circuit's comparison of the statutes governing supervised release
violations to repeat offender laws ignores the absence of a new, for
mally established crime. This analogy is flawed because it suggests
that supervised release violators may be subjected to new criminal
punishment, like repeat offenders, when in fact no new crime has
been established through the procedurally relaxed violation
proceedings.
The Reese court defended its position against this procedural
protection argument by raising two points. First, the court gener
ally dismissed the argument by stating that "[n]o previous ex post
facto cases have focused on the nature of the procedural protec
tions afforded in hearings or trials on subsequent violations."20S
Second, the court cited to cases involving provisions that were en
acted, and subsequently altered, in administrative settings-specifi
cally prison regulations.206 The court asserted that like supervised
release violation proceedings, the proceedings addressing alleged
violations of prison regulations have also been governed by simi
larly relaxed procedural protection.207 The Sixth Circuit stated that
courts have not found ex post facto violations in these cases where
the altered prison regulations were applied to inmates imprisoned
punishes that conduct because of its nature, not because of the defendant's original
offense." Id. It continued, stating that "[c]onduct that violates the tenns of supervised
release ... is often not criminal." Id. The court then dismissed the repeat offender
analogy, reasoning that "the government punishes [those violations of release] only be
cause of the defendant's original offense. For that reason, we must link the punishment
imposed for the subsequent conduct to the original offense for ex post [acto purposes."
Id. at 860 (emphasis added). See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text for a dis
cussion of Beals; see also supra Part I.D.2 for a discussion of repeat offender statutes.
203. See, e.g., Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 7'lf!. (1948); Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S.
51 (1914); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912); McDonald v. Massachusetts,
180 U.S. 311 (1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895).
204. Gryger, 334 U.S. at 732 (emphasis added).
205. United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582, 589 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 2529 (1996).
206. See id. at 590.
207. See id. (citing Gilbert v. Peters, 55 F.3d 237, 239 (7th Cir. 1995), and Ewell v.
Murray, 11 F.3d 482, 485 (4th Cir. 1993».

1997]

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

537

before the alterations.208 A careful review of these cases highlights
some important distinctions between administrative provisions,
such as prison regulations, and the statutory provisions governing
supervised release violations.
The prison regulation cases, in not finding an ex post facto vio
lation, relied heavily on the particular nature of the prison regula
tions.209 The courts stated that prison regulations have been
classified as "administrative" provisions rather than penal.210 In
other words, these regulations were not designed to impose punish
ment, but rather to facilitate the achievement of a policy goal.211
Therefore, as "reasonable" prison regulations, the courts found that
these regulations could be applied to all inmates, regardless of
when the inmate entered prison.212 Additionally, the courts have
stated that the prisoners' ex post facto claims were without merit
because the alteration of prison regulations could reasonably have
been anticipated, at the time of sentencing, by every prisoner as a
necessary function of prison management.213
These distinctions diminish the strength of the Sixth Circuit's
use of the prison regulation cases as a defense to the procedural
protection argument. Although these cases appear to refute the
procedural protection argument posed by the other courts of ap
peals in response to the repeat offender analogy, the nature of
prison regulations and the function they serve in the prison environ
ment does not coincide with the system of supervised release. The
supervised release statutes are not designed for an administrative
environment.214 They are also not driven by policy goals (i.e. the
208. See iii.
209. See Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 238-39; Ewell, 11 F.3d at 485-86.
210. See Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 238-39; Ewell, 11 F.3d at 485-86.
211. A general policy goal has been defined as achieving "good prison adminis
tration, safety and efficiency." Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302,309 (4th Cir. 1992). Em
phasizing the importance of allowing prison administrators to adopt new regulations in
order to effectuate this policy goal, the court in Jones added that the adoption of such
regulations is "contemplated as part of the sentence of every prisoner ... [and subse
quent punishment for infractions does] not constitute additional punishment ...." Id.
212. See Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 239; Ewell, 11 F.3d at 486.
213. See Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 239 (citing Jones, 962 F.2d at 309). See also Ewell, 11
F.3d at 487 ("[T]he prison regulation ordering inmate compliance with an administra
tive regulation is reasonably within the administrative structure of prison authority that
attends every sentence.").
214. The prison regulations in the aforementioned cases were specifically
designed to attain various policy goals. For example, in Gilbert, the requirement of a
blood sample was designed "for the sole purpose of establishing a data bank which
[would] aid future law enforcement." Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 239 (quoting Jones, 962 F.2d at
309). Such policy goals are absent from the supervised release statutes. Conversely,
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collection of blood samples for law enforcement purposes).21S· Con
versely, these statutes penalize defendants for violating the condi
tions of their release. Accordingly, unlike changes in prison
regulations, the alteration of the statutory provisions governing su
pervised release cannot be included under the umbrella of "reason
ably anticipated administrative functions" as the Sixth Circuit
necessarily did. The supervised, release statutes serve to impose
penalties for violations of mandatory conditions of release. Conse
quently, without support for its assertion that the lack of procedural
protection afforded defendants in supervised release violation pro
ceedings is insignificant for ex post facto purposes, it is difficult to
find merit in the Sixth Circuit's repeat offender analogy.
C.

The New Statutory Provisipns Are Only Applicable to
Defendants Who Commit a Subsequent Offense

The Sixth Circuit in Ree~e attempted to clarify its position, at
more than one point in its opinion, by stating that the new "disad
vantage" imposed under the amended statutory provision did not
apply to everyone who had committed the same underlying offense
as the defendant. The new provision only applied to those defend
ants who committed some subsequent offense, after the amendment
had gone into effect.216 As stated by the court, "[a] person on su
pervised release, situated identically to [the defendant] ... would
have suffered no ill consequences from the passage of the new law
...."217 The court claimed that it would be illogical to "argue[]
that the punishment is being imposed 'because of' the earlier con
duct."218 This argument essentially maintains that if the defendant
in Reese did not continue to test positive for drug use while on su
pervised release, he would have been unaffected by the new statu
tory provision. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that when
the terms of the new provision were imposed, they were imposed

these statutes are designed to sanction individuals for violating the tenns of their re
lease. See supra Part I.B.l for a discussion of the statutory provisions governing super
vised release violations.
215. This was the policy goal behind the regulations at issue in Gilbert, Ewell and
Jones. See Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 238-39; Ewell, 11 F.3d at 485-86; Jones, 962 F.2d at 309-10.
216. See United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582, 588-91 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 2529 (1996).
217. Id. at 590.
218. Id. In support of its argument, the Sixth Circuit noted that the most promi
nent Supreme Court ex post facto cases, those in which ex post facto violations had
been found, "involve[d] increases in punishment that appl[ied] to all prisoners, regard
less of later conduct." Id. (emphasis added).
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only for the defendant's most recent conduct-the violation of re
lease, or the conduct occurring after the enactment of the new
provision.219
The court in Reese is correct in stating that all similarly situated
defendants were affected in the same manner by the enactment of
the new supervised release statutory provisions, and that the de
fendant in its case was not subjected to the new provision until he
violated release. Nonetheless, this does little to advance the Sixth
Circuit's position, primarily in light of the Supreme Court's affirma
tion of Greenfield v. Scafati.220
In Greenfield, Massachusetts altered its good-time credit sys
tem so that any inmate violating parole would be precluded from
accumulating good-conduct credit upon returning to prison. The
amendment affected every prisoner who had been sentenced before
the amendment equally.221 Stated differently, if every prisoner in
the defendant's position had refrained from violating parole, the
new provision would have had no effect on their accumulation of
good-time credits.222 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court affirmed the
district court's conclusion that the application of the new statute to
inmates imprisoned before its enactment violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause.223 The district court had justified its holding by stating that
the new statute prevented these inmates from being released as
early as they might have been under the previous version of the
statute. The district court reached its conclusion despite the fact
that the new provision was triggered by conduct occurring after its
enactment.224 The statutory provisions at issue in the supervised
release violation cases operated in the same manner as the provi
219. See id.
220. 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967) (three-judge court), affd mem., 390 U.S.
713 (1968).
.
221. See Greenfield, 277 F. Supp. at 645. The amendment did not apply to those
persons who were already on parole when the amendment went into effect. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 646.
224. See id. at 645-46. See also Williams v. Lee, 33 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1994)
(prohibiting the retroactive application of a new statute enhancing the penalty for pa
role violations despite the fact that the defendant was on notice of the new provision);
Fender v. Thompson, 883 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1989) (prohibiting the retroactive applica
tion of a new parole eligibility statute enacted after the defendant's original crime but
before the parole violation); Beebe v. Phelps, 650 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)
(per curiam) (holding that the application of a new statute providing for the forfeiture
of good-time credits upon revocation of parole, enacted after the defendant's conviction
but before his parole, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because the forfeiture extended
the time remaining to be served on the defendant's original sentence).

540

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:499

sion at issue in Greenfield. The new provision at issue in Reese was
enacted after the commission of the defendant's original offense,
but before the violations of release. Nonetheless, when applied, it
had the effect of imposing a longer sentence on an individual who,
quite possibly, would have received a much shorter term of impris
onment under the version of the statute in place at the time his
original crime was committed. In other words, like the altered
good-time provisions in the parole cases, the new provision gov
erning supervised release extends the time remaining on the de
fendant's original sentence. Whether the change takes place before
or after the violation of release, the new provisions retroactively
alter the punishment for the original offense. The Sixth Circuit
failed to consider this point.
The Sixth Circuit did not place any significance on the Green
field line of cases because, in the court's opinion, supervised release
is an inherently different system than both parole and probation.225
In making these distinctions, and thereby refusing to adhere to the
reasoning of Greenfield, the Sixth Circuit chose not to follow rather
convincing precedent.226 The majority of courts of appeals, rather
than comparing supervised release statutes to repeat offender laws,
reasoned that supervised release revocation is equivalent to parole
revocation for ex post facto purposes.227 This view offers a sound
characterization of the supervised release system.
Under the parole system, the statutes in place at the time of
sentencing set forth the manner in which a defendant would earn
the right to serve a portion of that sentence outside of prison. 228 In
addition, these statutes determined what would have happened had
the defendant violated any of the parole conditions. Similarly,
under the supervised release system, the statutes in place at the
time of sentencing establish, or dictate how a court is to establish,
the terms and conditions of release. 229 These provisions also set
forth the punishments for release violations.230 In other words, like
the terms governing a prisoner's eligibility for parole, the conditions
225. See United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582, 587 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 2529 (1996) ("There is an inherent difference between probation and supervised
release."). See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Sixth
Circuit's comparison of supervised release to parole and probation.
226. See supra Parts 1.0.1 and II.A for a discussion of cases following the reason
ing of Greenfield.
227. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of these cases.
228. See supra note 32 for a brief discussion of the parole system.
229. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (1994).
230. See ill.
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attached to a defendant's term of supervised release are imposed as
part of the defendant's original sentence.231 For this reason, the
majority of courts of appeals have accurately compared supervised
release to parole for purposes of ex post facto analysis and followed
the reasoning used in the Greenfield line of cases.232
As previously stated, the Sixth Circuit in Reese attempted to
distinguish the two systems by asserting that, as opposed to terms of
imprisonment following parole revocation, terms of imprisonment
following supervised release revocation can exceed the maximum
allowed for the original offense.233 Again, this argument ignores
the connection between supervised release and the original sen-·
tence.234 It also places great weight on a distinction that has little
bearing on the ex post facto issue. The majority of courts of ap
peals adhered to the nature of the supervised release system as for
mulated by Congress and the Sentencing Commission.235 These
courts focused on the function of supervised release as a component
of a defendant's original sentence. Accordingly, the Seventh Cir
cuit in United States v. Beals placed this issue in the proper perspec
tive.236 In addressing the differences between parole and
supervised release, it concluded that "[the] distinction[s] [are]
meaningless for purposes of ex post facto analysis. Under both sys
tems, a defendant is sentenced for an original offense to a combina
tion of imprisonment and post-imprisonment release."237
231. Several courts of appeals have applied this reasoning. See, e.g., United
States v. Beals, 'if1 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117 (2d
Cir. 1994); United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 'if13 (9th Cir. 1993).
232. Additionally, given the similarities between supervised release revocation
and probation revocation, the comparison of supervised release to parole is further sup
ported by the Supreme Court's view that despite the "undoubted minor differences"
between the two systems, there is no constitutional difference between revocation of
probation and parole revocation. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.3 (1973). See
supra note 35 and accompanying text for a discussion of supervised release and proba
tion. Although the Court's assertion in Gagnon was made in the context of due process
analysis, it indicates that the differences between supervised release and parole, at least
for ex post facto purposes, are not as great as the Sixth Circuit in Reese suggests. See
United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1121 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Gagnon in a compari
son of supervised release, probation and parole).
233. See United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582, 5'if1-BB (6th Cir. 1995), cen. denied,
116 S. Ct. 2529 (1996).
234. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the connection between supervised
release and a defendant's original sentence.
235. See supra Parts I.A-B for a discussion of the development and characteris
tics of the supervised release system. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of courts
which relied on this background in reaching their decisions.
236. See Beals, 'if1 F.3d at 859-60.
237. Id. at 860.
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CONCLUSION

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 led to the development of
the supervised release system in an effort to replace the much criti
cized parole system that produced unfair and inconsistent sentenc
ing. Congress justified supervised release as a method of tailoring
sentences to the needs of individual defendants based on the nature
of the crime committed as well as the characteristics of the particu
lar defendant. The statutes and guidelines in place at the time of
sentencing were designed to dictate the administration of super
vised release, including the conditions of the term as well as the
penalties attached to subsequent violations. The modification of
these statutes resulted in a split among the federal courts of appeals
concerning the question of whether the application of the amended
statutes to defendants sentenced before the amendments gives rise
to an ex post facto violation.
Contrary to the weight of precedent, the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Reese did not find an ex post facto violation, primarily be
cause that court viewed the punishment for supervised release vio
lations as constituting a separate punishment from the one imposed
for the original crime. Accordingly, the court did not see a retroac
tive application of an altered law. The remaining circuits deciding
the issue, however, reached the opposite conclusion. These courts
held that sanctions imposed for supervised release violations were
inherently part of the original sentence, and that any altered ver
sion of those sanctions could not be applied to defendants who had
committed their crimes before the alteration was made, at least
where the alteration had the effect of increasing the defendant's
punishment. The latter view appears to be more consistent with the
nature of the supervised release system.
As indicated by Congress and the Sentencing Commission, su
pervised release is a form of punishment given in addition to a term
of imprisonment as part of a defendant's sentence for a crime.
While it is a separate form of punishment, it is very much a part of
that original sentence. The conditions of supervised release are im
posed at the time of sentencing, as are the penalties attached to
violations of those conditions. Additionally, violations are not
crimes in and of themselves. They are acts deemed punishable
under the supervised release provisions only because the defendant
committed the original offense. In these respects, supervised re
lease is essentially equivalent to parole, a system in which courts
have viewed the application of amended statutes to defendants who
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committed their crimes before the amendments to violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause. These courts held that restricting a defendant's
eligibility for parole essentially alters the punishment for the de
fendant's original crime. The cases involving supervised release
statutes are analogous. The supervised release cases involve the
same retroactive application of amended statutory provisions, pro
visions which, in their previous -forms, established the foundation of
the defendant's original sentence. This is the very practice that the
Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution was written to prohibit.
Ryan M. Zenga

